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There has been a great deal of attention focused on the issue of confi-
dentiality of personal information generally, and in particular of personal 
medical information. Some recent proposals have focused on facilitating 
individual control over the information via creation of a new property right 
in personal information.9 This article takes a different approach, focusing 
instead on the nature of the interests in both confidentiality and disclosure. 
Privacy. interests are not homogenous; they vary in different contexts. By 
focusing on the postmortem context, where guidelines are generally absent, 
there is additional freedom to challenge traditional conceptions of privacy 
and rights of individual control. Rather than assume the primacy of indi-
vidual privacy interests, this article engages in a detailed analysis of confi-
dentiality and disclosure interests. Although existing . confidentiality pro-
tections in the pre-mortem context should have been based on such evalua .. 
tion, I believe additional scrutiny is warranted before accepting the frame-
work of current confidentiality protections into the postmortem context. 
Such ethical evaluation will yield better answers to legal and policy ques-
tions regarding privacy protections in different settings. 
This Article begins by briefly highlighting the current legal and ethical 
protections of confidentiality for people currently living. Against this 
backdrop, this Article considers the scope of confidentiality protections 
and· exceptions for people who have died. In doing so, this Article ana-
lyzes the type and extent of interests in maintaining confidentiality post-
mortem .. Finally, .this Article proposes a framework for determining the 
circumstances under which disclosure of confidential information postmor-
tem is appropriate. Although the framework is developed in the context of 
postmortem disclosures, its guidance may prove useful in evaluating confi-
dentiality protections in the prernortem context as well. 
H. LEGAL AND ETHICAL BACKGROUND ON CONFIDENTIALITY 
Despite the general and overt acceptance of confidentiality rules within the 
medical community, these rules· have never functioned as an absolute bar. 
to disclosure. 10 · As the United States Supreme Court stated in Whalen v. 
In the 1998 decision of Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399,401 (1998), the Supreme 
Court held that the attorney-client privilege survives the client's death~ At issue in the case was the 
discoverability of handwritten notes taken during a meeting between White House counsel Vince 
Foster and his attorney nine days before Foster•s suicide. /d. at 401..02. In holding that the privilege 
continued to apply, the Court stressed the .need to assure confidentiality in communications between 
clients and attorneys, thus facilitating full disclosure from the client. /d. at 407. 
9 See discussion infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
10 Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection 
of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REv. 255, 267-68 (1984). First, the legal and ethical protections may be 
waived. No breach occurs when a patient has authorized disclosure. See, e.g., discussion infra note 
129. Second, when the patient is incompetent. certain individuals may be legally authorized to receive 
infonnation that would otherwise be confidential. Thus surrogates or health care guardians have a right 
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Roe, disclosure of confidential medical information is often necessary, and 
not 
meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasion~ 
of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care. Un-
questionably, some individuals' concern for their own privacy may 
lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical attention. Nev-
ertheless, disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to 
hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health 
agencies are often an essential part of modem medical practice. 11 
While existent legal and ethical protections for confidentiality evidence 
the value our society places on privacy, 12 they may be outweighed in cases 
where other societal values, such as public health and safety, take prece~ 
dence. 
to their ward's medical information, and parents generally have a right to their children's medical 
information. See WILLIAM H. ROACH, JR., MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW 108-10 (1998). Third, 
although there are a number of different bases for confidentiality, no theory provides complete protec-
tion from disclosure, and each allows for exceptions based on a balancing of the interests promoted by 
confidentiality versus the interests promoted by disclosure. See, e.g .• AM. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF MED. 
ETHICS, Opinion 5.05, 105 (2000) (stating that "[t]he information disclosed to a physician during-the 
course of the relationship between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest possible de· 
gree''). 
11 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977) (considering the constitutionality of a New York 
statute that required the reporting of the names of patients receiving certain prescription drugs). 
12 Privacy protections focus on the patient's ability to keep information from being knOWil (some· 
times even by the patient himself, such as what happens when the patient refuses genetic testing regard-
ing the presence of a particular gene). Confidentiality protections, on the other hand, deal with infor-
mation that is known by someone else besides the patient and focus on the patient's ability to keep 
other individual(s) from disclosing the information to third parties. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC 
HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 127-29 (2000). 
At the outset it is important to distinguish between legal protections for confidentiality and legal 
privileges. Privileges are evidentiary protections that function in the context of litigation. In other 
words, they prevent certain information. from being used as evidence in a legal case. See generally 
Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). Historically. information disclosed by a 
patient to a physician could not be disclosed by the physician in the course of legal proceedings without 
the patient's permission, with few exceptions. See generally Steven Smith, Medical and Psychother-
apy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving with One Hand and Removing with the Other, 15 KY. 
L.J. 473 (1986). Thus, a physician could not be forced to reveal patient confidences in the courtroom. 
See id. Today, most states have dispensed with the. patient-physician privilege. The one exception to 
this is the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which remains viable. /d. at 487 n.35. 
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A. Legal Protections13 
There are both state and federal protections of confidentiality.14 State 
confidentiality protections vary considerably. 15 Few states have compre-
hensive confidentiality laws; many states control disclosure of health in-
formation through an amalgam of statutes that address everything from 
particular disease information to autopsy records. 16 In fact, some states 
eschew the notion of a general confidentiality statute and simply legislate 
specific exceptions with the assumption that common law or constitutional 
protections for health information will suffice. 17 Most problematic. about 
the current confidentiality protections are the lack of sanctions18 for 
breaches and undesirability of the legal remedy. That is, the solution for a 
patient who has discovered a breach of confidentiality is to go to court and 
disclose the information they did not want anyone to know in the first 
place! Thus, it becomes extremely important to craft front-end safeguards 
that prevent unauthorized breaches from occurring, while at the same time 
13 Privacy is often thought of as a .. fundamental" right and there are a variety of legal protections 
that may fall into this category. These include protections of an individual's home, body, and personal 
inforro.ation. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928). Most issues of informational 
privacy (and thus confidentiality) are addressed by, or remedied under, tort law. there are several 
types of lawsuits for invasion of privacy including unreasonable: a) intrusions upon seclusion; b) ap-; 
propriation of name/likeness; c) publicity of private life; and d) placing someone in a false light RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652A (2000). However, personal infonnation (what is at issue in 
medical confidentiality) is not protected at law in the same way one's h()me or bodily integrity is pro--
tected. In fact, quite a bit of personal information is not protected at alt. For example, it is fairly sim· 
pie to obtain a person's credit history (even legally) in contrast to his/her medical history despite the 
fact that both may be considered highly personal, and thus private, infonnation. One author argues that · 
privacy protections are basically a means to protect other interests such as reputation, avoidance of 
embarrassment or ,shame, or discrimination and do not necessarily support the notion that certain in· 
formation is inherently private. See generally Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Infor-
mation: An Economic Defense of Property, 84 Goo. L.J. 2381 (1996). 
14 See discussion infra notes 16, 21,24 and accompanying text. 
15 See discussion infra notes 16, 21, 24 and accompanying text. , 
Hi State laws either address the type of information (usually based on disease or illness) or the ~n-
tity holding the information (such as government agencies), or both. JOY PRITIS ET AL., HEALTH 
PRIVACY PROJECT, GEO. U. INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REs. AND POL'Y, THE STATE OF HEALTH PRI-
VACY: AN UNEVEN TERRAIN 22, available at http://www.georgetown.edu/research/ihcrp/privacy 
.statereportpdf. (last visited Sep. 19, 2001) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review). Thirty-five 
states place some restrictions on the use of information contained in medica,l records that are held by 
state agencies. ld. at 32. Twenty states have legislation restricting disclosure of medical infonnation 
from hospitals and health care facilities. ld. Thirty-seven states also have statutes governing how 
managed care organizations may use patient information and eighteen specifically regulate the use of 
such infonnation by insurance companies. /d. 
17 See, e.g., King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495-96 (Ga. 2000) (quoting Pavesich v. New England 
Life Ins. Co. 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905)) ("'A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore 
derived from natural law.' Applying this definition, a patient's medical information, as reflected in the 
records maintained by his or her medical providers, is certainly a matter which a reasonable person 
would consider to be private."). 
18 But see HAW. REv. STAT. § 323C-51 (2000) (stating that persons intentionally obtaining or 
disclosing protected health infonnation are guilty of a class C felony). 
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accommodating needs for information (for example, to treat patients, as-
quality health care, and conduct research to achieve health advances). 
Like the state laws, the federal framework includes specific protections 
for types of confidential infonnation,19 as well as protections aimed at par-
ticular federal agencies that gather and store health information. 20 Because 
of the variability of these laws, as well as the proliferation of new forms of 
the electronic retention and transfer of medical information, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIP AA) required 
Congress to pass comprehensive confidentiality protections by 1999.21 
Since Congress failed to meet this deadline, the Department of Health and 
Human Services issued proposed regulations on November 3, 1999 and 
final regulations on December 28, 2000.22 The proposed regulations speak 
briefly about postmortem confidentiality. They state that all protections 
expire two years after the patient's death,23 however, like the amalgam of 
state24 and other federal laws, the_,-proposed regulations provide little spe-
cific guidance in this context. 2s 
B. Ethical Basis for Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is both a legal and an ethical doctrine. A physician's 
duty to keep information confidential dates pack to the earliest codes of 
medical ethics. For example, the Hippocratic Oath requires a physician to 
promise that: "[ w ]hat I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or 
even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no ac-
count one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such things 
j 
19 ROACH. supra note 10, at 231-32 (discussing Center for Disease Control guidelines regarding 
patient notification ofHIV-positive healthcare workers). 
20 See Prlvacy and Disclosure of Official Records and Information Available to the Public, 20 
C.F.R. §§ 401,402,422 (2001). 
21 Standards for Privacy of Individually lndentifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 
(Dec. 28, 2000) {to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). Health and Human Services ( .. HHS") issued 
proposed regulations on November 3, 1999. ld. The comment period for these regulations recently 
ended and fina1 regulations were issued on December 28, 2000. ld. They will take effect two years 
from this date. /d. It is still possible that. within the intervening time period, Congress will enact 
legislation that supercedes the rules; 
22/d. 
23 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information 64 Fed. Reg. 59,950 
(Nov. 3, 1999) (the proposed rule issued by HHS). However, this time period was not included in the 
final rule. See 65 Fed. Reg. 82 (2000). 
24 But see HAW. REv. STAT. §.323C-43(2000) (stating comprehensive protections under the Pri-
vacy of Health Care Information Act will continue to apply following the death of an individual); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-I 6-504( 10) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.02.01 0{10) (2000); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 3S-2-605(a)(xiii) (Michie 2001). Iowa implies that the duty of employees of a Health 
Maintenance Organization ("HMO") to keep information confidential extends beyond death. See IOWA 
CODE ANN. § S 14B.30 (West 2000) (HMO employee "shall not testify as to such confidential commu-
nication or make other public disclosure thereof without the express consent of the person or the per· 
son's legal representative, if the person is deceased .... "). 
25 See discussion supra note 23. 
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shameful to be spoken about. •.. "26 This is an absolute prohibition if taken 
literally. Both the World Medical Organization's Declaration of Geneva 
and the International Code of Medical Ethics admonish the physician to 
maintain confidentiality, even after the patient's death. However, they do 
not identify any basis for evaluating requests for disclosure.27 The Ameri-
can Medical Association's ("AMA") Council on Ethical andJudicial Af-
fairs recently stated that "all information within a deceased patient's medi-
cal record, including information entered postmortem, should be kept con-
fidential to the greatest possible degree,,.. and provides specific guidelines 
for evaluating exceptions?8 
However, drawing from ethical codes, especially those without spe-
cific guidelines, is no more helpful than drawing from laws that state sim-
ple rules without providing reasons. Neither provides the additional guid-
ance necessary to apply the general doctrine of confidentiality in the post-
mortem context. Instead, we might look to ethical theory to explain the 
purpose of confidentiality protections and thus provide an indication as to 
how they should function in different circumstances. In general, maintain-
ing confidentiality has been justified in terms of the personal and social 
consequences of the practice, the necessary role of trust in fiduciary rela-
tionships, the intrinsic value of privacy as a human good, and the interper-
sonal demands of human dignity and autonomy. Although different phi-
losophers and philosophical traditions emphasize some of these justifica-
tions over others, in practice, scholars of professional medical ethics com-
bine them as mutually supporting, complementary reasons to endorse the 
medical profession's tradition of secret-keeping. 29 Importantly, each of the 
26 ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEiN 6 (Oswei Temkin & C. Lilian 
Temkin eds., 1967). · 
27 Bernard Friedland, Physician-Patient Confidentiality, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 249,256-57 (1994). 
28 It recommends that physicians consider the following factors in determining whether to 
disclose infonnation: · 
the imminence ofhann to identifiable individuals or the public health; 
the potential benefit to at-risk individuals or the pub1ic health . . . ; 
any statement or directive made by the patient regarding postmortem disclosure; 
the impact disclosure may have on the reputation of the deceased patient; and 
the personal gain for the physician that may unduly influence professional obligations 
of confidentiality. 
AM. MED. ASS'N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUD. AFFS;, CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
POSTMORTEM REPORT 5-A..OO (June 2000). I served as both the Secretary of the Council. and subse-
quently a consultant to the Council, during the time period in which this report was developed. 
29 For example, according to Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, confidentiality protections 
can be justified using three types of arguments: consequentialist, rights-based autonomy and fidelity· 
based. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 422 (4th ed. 
1994). Principle-based theories are deontological in the sense that they focus on promoting certain 
values, rather than weighing outcomes. But . unlike the general deontotogical theories, princ:iplists 
acknowledge from the start that there are likely to be a number of principles that should guide our 
actions and that a balance must be achieved. Confidentiality is sometimes listed as a prima facie prin-
ciple and other times subsumed under discussions of autonomy with exceptions based on physician 
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philosophical arguments allow for exceptions in particular circumstances, 
based on the balance between the goals achieved by confidentiality and the 
goals achieved by disclosure. 30 
The rationales reduce to two primary . values-privacy and health. 
Both of these map onto two of the main classes of ethical theory: deontol-
ogy and consequentialism. Despite the different goals, neither justifies 
absolute confidentiality protection. First, deontological theories evaluate 
the ethics of alternative courses of action based on the importance of par-
ticular values, without regard to the consequences of promoting those val-
ues. 31 One basic form of deontological reasoning is to test tbe justice of a 
particular action or practice by universalizing it: if a practice cannot be 
sustained when everyone does it, it violates our sense that moral rules 
ought to apply equally to ail autonomous moral agents. 32 Another variation 
on this mode of reasoning is to posit a hypothetical group of social contrac-
tors charged with writing universal rules of conduct in ignorance of their 
own individual interests. 33 Privacy or confidentiality is valuable under this 
system for its own sake, apart from the consequences of the practice. Al-
though absolute confidentiality protections would be compatible with uni-
versal adherence, so too is a system of limited confidentiality protections, 
if the exceptions are specified in advance as part of the rule. Because uni-
versalizable duties must be compatible with, or balanced against, the exist-
ing system of other universalized duties34 (for example, professional duties 
to prevent harm), more variegated rules involving specified exceptions 
would likely be approved. In fact, deontological theories promote a num-
ber of values, privacy would just be one of many. In the medical confiden-
obligations ofbeneficence. See id. at 266-67,423-24. 
30 !d. at 423. 
31 One of the most famous deontologists is Immanuel Kant who argued that determining the 
moral or right action in a particular circumstance depends on one's ability to universalize the rule 
governing the act, otherwise known as the "categorical imperative." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING 
FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 26, 30 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g, 1981). With 
respect to confidentiality, a maxim would look something like "physicians should keep all infonnation 
obtained from patients confidential:' However, there may; be competing obligations that cause us to 
want to modify this rule, such as a physician's obligation to safeguard the public's health. See discus-
sion infra note 91. One of the major failings ofK.antian ethics (and many other deontological theories) 
is its lack of guidance for dealing with conflicting maxims. 
32 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 29, at 423. 
33 John Rawls' adaptation of Kantian ethics attempts to demonstrate how a deontological theory 
can be applied to understand the social contract existing in a just society. See generally JOHN RAWLS, 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE ( 1973). He argues that valid ethical principles governing action are those to 
which rational agents would all agree if situated behind a hypothetical "veil of ignorance" (i.e., blind as 
to individual interests). /d. at 136-37, 139. In this state, we might agree that a rule favoring confidenti-
ality of medical infonnation is ideal (since we would not then know our individual infonnation needs), 
but we might also agree at the outset to certain exceptions to confidentiality based on competing values. 
34 See id. at 136-37, 139 (pointing out that general information would be possessed by decision 
makers in arriving at solutions that would be universalized). 
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tiality context, the value of privacy would have to be considered alongside 
the value of heath. 
Although deontological theories provide a basis for justifying confi-
dentiality / 5 the more likely basis for the current protections is essentially 
consequentialist or practical. "The patient should feel free to make a full 
disclosure of information to the physician in order that the physician may 
most effectively provide needed services. "36 Consequentialist theories, 
such as utilitarianism determine the ethical or correct course of action by 
looking at the consequences of different alternatives. The alternative that 
leads to the best result, however defined (for example, most happiness, 
greatest good, etc.), is the ethical one. 37 Confidentiality is thought to be a 
necessary requirement of the patient-physician relationship. 38 Without 
assurances of privacy, patients may be less likely to disclose information 
pertinent to their medical care. 39 As a result, physicians will be unable to 
provide appropriate treatment. In other words, confidentiality protections 
are thought to promote health. Thus, a general requirement of confidenti-
ality is applied to medical practice. However, exceptions to this general 
35 While Kantian ethics is not new. arguments for legal (and some ethical) protections based on 
patient rights of autonomy in the medical context are. Take, for example, the law of informed consent. 
One legal scholar tracing the evolution of informed consent questioned whether "autonomy ..• was put 
forward as the genuine rationale for the ... doctrine of informed consent. or whether it was merely a 
convenient notion-an attractive philosophical and ethical symbol or benchmark at which to nod in 
passing.'* Nicholas P. Terry, Apologetic Tort Think: Autonomy and Information Torts, 38 ST. LoUIS U. 
L.J. 189-91 (1993). Likewise, arguments that confidentiality protections are based on patient autonomy 
are also probably post hoc rationalizations. This does not mean that the arguments are not valid rea-
sons to maintain confidentiality protections. but they are not the likely basis for the development of the 
protections in the first place. Significantly, confidentiality protections originated in most medical codes 
and only later were picked up by law. Friedland, supra note 27, at 256-57. Patient autonomy was an 
almost nonexistent concept in medicine until fairly recently, although there has been some support for 
general notions of privacy (a concept related to autonomy). See CoMM. ON ENERGY AND COM. DE· 
MOCRATS, PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS, at http://www.house.gov/commerce_democrats/pbor 
/pborhome.shtml (last visited Sep. 27, 2001) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review) (setting forth a 
discussion and text of a proposed Patient's Bill of Rights addressing patient autonomy). But here, 
again, there is little evidence of a freestanding notion of patient privacy, but rather concern appears to 
be focused on practical constraints that would encourage physicians to maintain confidences. 
36 AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 10, at 105. 
37 See BLTC REs., UTILITARIANISM REsOURCES, at http://www.utilitarianism.com (last visited 
Sep. 27, 2001) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review) (listing a utilitarian glossary and a discussion 
of tb.e several types of utilitarianism). "Rule*utiltarianism" seeks to effectuate rules that will generally 
result in the greatest good (e.g., a rule that physicians should keep patient confidences). /d. "Act-
utilitarianism," on the other hand. focuses on individual acts and in each cases evaluates what action 
will lead to the greatest good (which may or may not result in the physician maintaining confidential~ 
ity). /d. 
38 See AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 10, at lOS; 
39 For example, because of the. high risk of discrimination. patients may be unwilling to disclose 
HIV status to their physician if they fear disclosure. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(1) (West 2001 
Supp.) ("The Legislature finds that despite ... confidential use of tests designed to reveal human im-
munodeficiency virus infection, many members of the public are deterred from seeking such testing 
because they misunderstand the nature of the test or fear that test results will be disclosed without their 
consent."). 
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rule apply when the cost of maintaining confidences is outweighed by the · 
harm to others. In other words, when the value served by protecting confi· 
dentiality, such as promoting overall health is better served by disclosure, 
an exception should exist. 40 
III. POSTMORTEM CONFIDENTIALITY 
To what extent should confidentiality protections or exceptions apply 
after a patient has died? I argue that-given the lack of legal guidance, as 
well as the theoretical and ethical framework that values both health and 
privacy-the extent of postmortem confidentiality protections should de-
pend on an analysis of the interests served by confidentiality and the inter-
ests served by disclosure. However, before we can evaluate the interests 
involved, we must identify them. There are three groups of interests in 
maintaining confidentiality protections postmortem that I will address. 
First, deceased patients may have interests, including an interest in confi-
dentiality, that survives death. In addition, patients, or potential patients, 
who are now living, may have an interest in assuring that information they 
disclose remains confidential postmortem. These two issues are addressed 
first and second respectively. At the end of this Part, I will consider the 
interests of third parties in maintaining confidentiality of medical informa-
tion pertaining to the deceased. In. the final Part of this Article, I . evaluate 
the types of interests in disclosure, extrapolating from the range of excep-
tions in the premortem context, and· propose guidelines for postmortem 
confidentiality protections. 
A. Interests of the Deceased 
It is an interesting philosophical exercise to consider whether dead 
people have interests that survive their death, and, if so, whether they can 
be "harmed'~ or ''wronged" by actions taken after their death:n According 
to Joel Feinberg, the question of whether certain entities have rights can be 
answered, in part, by examining their interests. 42 Bonnie Steinbock further 
40 One of the biggest problen-.s with assumptions about the effect of new mles or exceptions on 
patient behavior is that we do not necessarily have an idea about how the current system impacts pa~ 
tient's willingness to share confidential infonnation with their physiCians. See BEAUCHAMP & CHIL-
DRESS, supra note 29, at 423. In fact, it may be that patients and physicians may have differing 
conceptions of confidentiality, and that the legal protections do not match either of these conceptions. 
If so, it is not clear what role the law plays (or should play} in this context. 
41 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 29, at 423. I do not address the various theological 
arguments that there is some kind of "afterlife."' This would, i believe, provide one of the strongest 
arguments for postmortem interests. A full analysis of such arguments are best left to thQse trained in 
religious dQctrine (or perhaps those who have experienced the phenomenon). 
42 See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 33-34 (1984) 
(proposing only entities with interests are owed obligations, such as confidentiality). 
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explains Feinberg's position,43 noting that interests are premised on desires 
or wants, thus require consciousness. 44 This does not mean that an 
individual must be aware a particular desire, or even that he must be 
aware someone thwarts the desire: people can be banned by acts about 
which they are unaware. But an entity that can form no desires has no in-
terests. 
Corpses do not have interests because they do not meet the minimal 
condition of conscious awareness.4s Although it seems obvious that a dead 
body does not have interests, it is not so clear that a previously living per-
son has no interests that survive death. George Pitcher differentiates two 
ways one might describe someone who is now dead: (a) the antemortem 
person (for example, the person as he was during his life), and (b) the 
postmortem person (for example, the person as be is now, a moldering 
corpse).46 This latter entity canp.ot be harmed or wronged. However, 
Pitcher argues, the antemortem person (or the person who. once lived) can 
be harmed. Feinberg uses Pitcher's distinction and argues that some of a 
person's interests survive his death and "in virtue of the defeat of these 
interests, either by death itself or by subsequent events, we can think of the 
person who was, as harmed. "47 In other words, the surviving interests are 
those of the .once-living person (antemortem person), not the now-dead 
person (postmortem person). Thus, Feinberg would argue that the ante-
mortem person can be harmed by all sorts of things, such as a broken 
promise to keep medical information confidential, or defamatory state-
ments which result in reputational harms. 
The most troubling aspect of this argument is the appearance of retro-
active causation-that an action taken after a person has died (and thus is 
no longer in existence) can harm the previously living person. Steinbock 
argues that Feinberg reconciles this problem by thinking about ''timelessly 
true" propositions. 48 In other words, we can agree that an individual now 
living can be harmed hy something after her death, and this hann is some-
thing that is timelessly true. Steinbock gives the example of breaking her 
ankle in six weeks time--she is not harmed now, nor retroactively harmed, 
nor harmed all along, but all along she had the property of being harmed at 
43 
BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS AND 
FETUSES 10·(1992). Entities that lack interests lack moral status, and thus can have no moral claims 
upon us (e.g., to maintain confidentiality). !d. Of course this does not mean that you can do anything 
you want to the being-there might be other interests that control. See also discussion infra pp. 95-96. 
44 STEINBOCK, supra riote 43, at 1()..24. 
4
s STEINBOCK, supra note 43, at 24-26. 
46 George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, 2 t AM. PHIL. Q. 183-84 ( 1984). 
47 FEINBERG, supra note 42, at 83. See also Anthony Serafini, Callahan on Harming the Dead, 
15 J. PHIL. REs. 329 (1989-1990) (arguing that there are "properties;• rather than "interests .. which 
survive death and can be harmed). 
48 STEINBOCK, supra note 43, at 25-26. 
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that particular time. 49 Joan Callahan considers this argument and con-
cludes that it actually should taken for the proposition that the dead can-
not be banned, only the living. 50 The retroactive, or all along property, of 
being harmed is designed to show that it is not the postmortem person who 
is banned, but the antemortem person, in ·our case the previously living 
patient. 
Callahan makes a strong argument that only the living can sustain 
hann, however, even if one were to accept that there are interests that sur-
vive death, there is still the issue of what harm is done to the deceased by 
breaching confidentiality.51 Feinberg describes the harm to interests in 
terms of blocking of goals or thwarting of desires. 52 He notes that although 
dead people cannot get what W.D. Ross calls "want-satisfaction," or the 
feeling of satisfaction that one's desires have been fulfilled, they can get 
"want-fulfillment" even though they are unaware of this fulfillment.53 
Thus, a person may be harmed after he has died, if his wants or desires are 
not fulfilled. In the confidentiality context, this translates into the thwart-
ing of the individual's desire to maintain confidentiality. To some extent, 
this appears to depend· on whether the individual did actually desire to 
maintain confidentiality postmortem. But unlike thwarting a person's de-
sires as written in her wiil, in most cases there wili not be a specific indica-
tion about the patient's wishes regarding disclosure of infonnation after 
Another possibility is that the individual is wronged because the physi-
cian breaches the "promise" to maintain confidentiality.54 Few physicians 
explicitly promise to maintain confidentiality and even fewer extend that 
promise to the postmortem context. Implied promises provide a shaky 
basis for confidentiality· protections since they must be proved in each 
case.55 A third possibility is that the harm is to identity, via memory, as 
49 /d. at 26. 
50 Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341,341-52 (1987). 
51 Id . . For example, Barbara Levenbook argues that the dead can be banned or wronged, but that 
Feinberg's reliance on "interests" as the basis for such harm is incorrect. Rather, she posits that the 
dead can sustain losses and it is these losses that fonn the basis of the hann. Barbara Baum Leven· 
book, Hanning Someone After His Death, 94 ETHICS 407, 401-19 (1984). For a critique of her posi-
tion, see Don Marquis. Harming the Dead, 96 ETHiCS 159, 159-61 (1985) and Levenbook's rebuttal, 
Barbara Baum Levenbook, Harming the Dead. Once Again, 96 ETHICS 162, 162-64 ( 1985). 
52 FEINBERG, supra note 42, at 85. 
53 ld. at 84. 
54 See, e.g., Serafini, supra note 47, at 329-39 (arguing that breach of an ethical promise to a per-
son now deceased hanns that person). See also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You. 52 STAN. L. 
REv. 1049, 1061-62 (2000) (identifying the weaknesses of a contractual approach to privacy). 
. 55 See Home v. Patton, 287 So.2d 824, 831 (Ala. 1973)(quoting Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,801 (N.D. Ohio 1965}; Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 688,674 n.6 (1977)). 
Almost every member of the public is aware of the promise of discretion contained in the 
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constructed by the person when alive. Feinberg states: "the desire to main-
tain a good reputation . . . can be the basis of interests that survive their 
owner's death ... and can be promoted or harmed by events subsequent to 
that death."56 This idea of harm to identity is tempting since it sounds very 
much like what confidentiality rules protect for living patients. We each 
play a role in constructing our own identity and thus our memory.57 
Adopting this idea, Dorothy Grover argues for a theory of posthumous 
harm based on the potential that events may have an adverse effect on the 
interpretation of a person's life. 58 She gives the example of a person who 
tries to be caring during his life, but, because of information disclosed after 
his death, causes everyone close to him to think he was faking compas· 
sion.59 
Are the interests of the dead in controlling identity via confidentiality 
weaker or stronger than those of living patients? It may be necessary to 
have stronger confidentiality protections in the· postmortem context be-
cause the individual in question is no longer available either to consent to 
the disclosure or to "defend, his or her reputation or identity .. Individual 
control over identity rests upon two related factors: the individual's ability 
!d. 
Hippocratic Oath, and every patient has a right to rely upon this warranty of silence. The 
promise of secrecy is as much an express warranty as the advertisement of a commercial en• 
trepreneur. Consequently, when a doctor breaches his duty of secrecy, he is in violation of 
part of his obligations under the contract. 
However, breach of contract cases for disclosure of confidential information are rare. Alan B. Vickery, 
Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 CQLUM. L~ REv. 1426,1444-48 (1982). 
56 FEINBERG, supra note 42, at 86. It is not clear that the interest in maintaining memory should 
include an interest in preventing the disclosure of true information; defamation or other legally pro-
tected harms to reputation deal with false statements. 
57 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 224 (1993). Ronald Dworkin alludes to this in his de-
scription of autonomy as "the capacity to express one's own character-values, commitments, convic· 
tions, and critical as well as experiential interests-:-in the life one leads." He further states that 
"[r]ecognizing an individual right of autonomy makes self-creation possible. It aJJows each ofus to be 
responsible for shaping our lives according to our own coherent or incoherent-but,· in any case, dis-
tinctive-personality." !d. 
There is a great deal of psychological literature examining the development and control over per-
sonal identity. Evaluation of this literature is beyond the scope of this article. For works which under-
take this evaluation, see JOHN KOTRE, WHITE GLOVES: HOW WE CREATE OURSELVES THROUGH 
l'-.1EMORY {1995) {discussing the role both real and false memories play in our lives), ELIZABEIH A. 
WAITES, MEMORY QUEST: TRAUMA AND THE SEARCH FOR PERSONAL HISTORY 85-105 (1997) (dis-
cussing rq)resentation and the self), and Joseph M. Fitzgerald, Autobiographical Memory and Social 
Cognition: Development of the Remembered Self in Adulthood. in SOCIAL COGNITION AND AGfNG 143-
71 (Thomas M. Hess and Fredda Blanchard-Fields eds .• 1999) (discussing the role of autobiographical 
memory for identity). 
58 Dorothy Grover defines harm as something that occun; "when circumstances either seriously 
impair the present quality of a person's life, or undermine the possibility that a given person could be in 
a position to choose (or reject) a life of good quality." Dorothy Grover, Posthumous Harm, 39 PHIL. Q. 
334, 347 (I 989). Under this construction of harm, posthumous harm would be possible since posthu-
mous events can have adverse effects on a person's life (or the interpretation ofthe person's life). 
59 /d. at 338. 
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to control what information other people know (confidentiality), as well as 
that individual's ability to shape his or her own personality and public im-
age (which includes controlling what private information is disclosed in the 
first place). Because dead people can no longer shape their public image 
by changing aspects of themselves, sharing private information, or defend-
ing, explaining or justifying their actions, the interest in maintaining iden-
tity is protected only to the extent that the deceased can "control" the dis-
semination of confidential information postmortem. 60 Thus, one might 
argue that confidentiality protections should be absolute in this context, or 
at least that the deceased's wishes regarding disclosure should be given 
great deference. 
However, even if deceased patients have fewer avenues to control 
identity, they are also subject to less hann.61 As noted previously, although 
the dead can have their premortem wants fulfilled (or hindered) they can-
not experience want satisfaction (or dissatisfaction).62 Moreover, the dead 
cannot be hurt, or feel pain, sadness, happiness, or any other physical or 
60 Consider the following example: a woman shoots her husband, but claims be is shot by an in-
truder. She is never charged with the crime. Sometime afrer her death her statements made to her 
psychotherapist about her role in the shooting are disclosed, ruining her reputation. As it turns out, 
however, she had been subject to spousal-abuse and had shot her husband during a particularly violent 
encounter. This information is not known by anyone cum::ntly living (she kept the abuse private). The 
woman's reputation would be significantly altered by this knowledge, but with her death (and the loss 
of the information) it is impossible to repair the damage done. 
61 As noted previously, I do not address the possibility of an afterlife. See supra note 41. There 
are some tort actions that survive the death ofthe banned individual.· EDWARDJ. KlONKA, TORTS IN A 
NUTSHELL 413 (3rd ed. 1999) (stating. "[a]bout one-third of the states provide for the survival of (1) 
all tort actions or (2) aU tort actions except defamation . . . . In general,· actions for harm to tangible 
property (real or personal) survive ..• "). Although many suits for damages brought by surviving 
family members seek to protect their interests (such as an action for wrongful death), RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 6521 (1977), others focus more Specifically on the interests of the deceased.· For 
example. traditional privacy law states that reputational banns do not survive death. ld. It is a well-
established principle that: "Actio personalis moritur cum persona." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 29 
(Sth ed. 1979) {personal actions die with the person). However, a minority of states allow suits for such 
things as defamation to be brought by a dec~ent's estate or surviving family. Francis M. Dougherty, 
Annotation, Defamation Action as Surviving PlaintifFs Death, Under Statute Not Specifically Covering 
Action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272 (2001) (analyzing state cases in which the courts determined whether a defa-
mation action survives upon the death of a plaintiff under survival statutes not specifically covering 
defamation actions). Most suits alleging lack of confidentiality would not rest of grounds of defama· 
tion since the information disclosed is usually true. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A 
(1977). See also Janet Kobrin, Confidentialtiy of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1283, 1300 
( 1983) (stating that "no court has held a physician liable for disclosure solely on the basis of defama-
tion"). See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander§ 356 (1995) (discussing libel and slander for 
deceased persons and their representatives); Lisa Brown, Dead But Not Forgotten: Proposals for Im-
posing Liability for Defamation of the Dead, 61 TEX. L. REv. 1525 (1989) (discussing the interests and 
issues that judges and legislatures must consider with proposals for relief from the effects of defama-
tion of the dead); Raymond Iryami. Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of 
Action for Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statutes. 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. LJ. 1083 (1999) (arguing that courts should imply a private cause of action for defamation of the 
dead to that decedent's representative and survivo£$). 
62 STEINBOCK, supra note 43, at 25. 
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emotional state. The potential harm 'to the living due to a breach of confi-
dentiality is two-fold. One aspect is the. harm of having information dis-
closed that they did not want known and thus having to suffer the conse-
quences of having that information known. The second aspect is knowing 
that their wishes were disregarded. The dead can· be harmed only with 
respect to the first aspect, having information disclosed that they did not 
want known. And even so, they cannot "suffer" the consequences in any 
real sense' of the word. 63 The notion of harm to iden~ty is an amorphous 
concept even for living patients. For the dead it is even more difficult to 
pin down. The result is that, although the dead may have some interests in 
maintaining confidentiality postmortem, this interest is not as strong as it is 
when the patient is living. Thus, other interests may take precedence when 
weighing the appropriateness of confidentiality versus disclosure. 
B. Interests of the Living 
Whether or not one accepts the argument that there are interests that 
survive death, there are clearly interests of the living that must be consid-
ered. 64 In fact, these interests seem to form a stronger basis for understand-
ing confidentiality protections in the postmortem context. First, there are 
the interests of current and future patients in assuming that information 
they disclose to their physicians will remain confidential. Second, there 
are interests of third parties in maintaining the confidentiality of informa-
tion related to the deceased. 
1. Interests of Current or Future Patients 
As stated previously, Joan Callahan argues that it is not the now-dead 
person who is harmed, but his previously living incarnation (Pitcher's 
antemortem person)~65 Furthermore, our use of language that implies harm 
or Wr-ong to the dead, is a psychological manifestation of our regard for the 
person who was once alive. It should not be taken to imply that we really . 
believe the dead have interests that survive. In particular, Callahan draws 
from the example of wills and notes that the practice of honoring wills is 
based largely on the fact that the wishes of the deceased ''coincide. with 
other values we hold important (the value of certain objects, the good of 
individual heirs, etc.). "66 Although we have a general morai conviction 
that people may dispose of their property after death, the obligation to 
63 Aristotle argues that: "it makes a difference whether the various sufferings befall the living or 
the dead ... if anything whether good or evil penetrates [the dead]. it must be something weak and 
neg1igible .... •• Grover, supra note 58, at 335 (citation omitted). He seems to recognize that the dead 
cannot be harmed in the same way as the living. 
64 And, in fact, my inclination is to agree with Callahan that the dead do not have interests. 
65 CaUahan, supra note 50, at 341. 
66 Id. at 350. 
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abide by their wishes is a moral obligation to people still living, not to 
deceased. 67 Likewise, we might argue that preserving confidentiality after 
death coincides with our value of confidentiality as a general practice. To 
the extent that preserving confidentiality in a particular case does not coin-
cide with our general societal values, it need not be maintained (regardless 
of the individual~s wishes). This mirrors the situation for living patients 
who cannot prevent the disclosure of confidential information in certain 
circumstances, such as when public health is at issue.68 
Ernest Partridge takes a slightly different stance.69 He argues·that there 
are general practices which people who are now living have an interest in 
preserving, even after death, including things like making wills, promises, 
and truth-telling.7° Consider the example of the execution of wills. People 
make. wills with the assumption that the wills will be effectuated after their 
death. Even if they retain no interests after death, they have an interest 
now in a system that assures that their wishes will be effectuated after 
death. Knowing that wills would not be executed, or that the execution 
would depend on a whim would harm people's current interests as well as 
make them less likely to make wills (or amass assets).71 
There are two ways to consider this argument. One way to think about 
this is from a consequentialist perspective. Consider the analogy to wills-
67 Callahan argues that a moral obligation exists as to the heirs named in the will. ld. at 351. 
Moreover, she notes that although we allow great latitude, there are some ethical restrictions on what 
people can do with their property after death. For example, we do not accommodate a person who asks 
to have their pet killed, or all their money buried with them. !d. at 350. 
68 See discussion infra note 88. 
69 In addressing Feinberg's reliance on want-satisfaction and want-fulfillment, Partridge notes 
that "[d]eath cancels not only the possibility of satisfaction but also the very point of fulfillment .. 
Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect, 91 ETHICS 243, 246 (1981). In fact, 
Partridge agrees with Feinberg that there is no difference between an .act (libel) that pertains to the 
living, but which has absolutely no effect, and an act that pertains to the dead. But rather than accept 
that the dead therefore may be harmed, he rejects the idea of harm to the living when there are no 
effects. He stresses, however, that this does not mean that libel (or other acts) are not morally wrong. 
He merely argues that we cannot base the moral wrongness on harm to the individual libeled. See id. at 
2,52. 
70 Id. at 258 ("I have an interest in affecting events beyond my death because I can imagine, an· 
ticipate, and evaluate such events now, I can now perceive their impact upon things and persons l care 
for now."). 
71 Although I have only anecdotal evidence, I suspect this might be one problem with encourag· 
ing people to create advance health care documents. such as living wills and advance instruction direc-
tives. There is evidence that these documents may not be effectuated after the patient has become 
incompetent, especially in situations requiring decisions about life-sustaining treatment (presumably 
the type of situation about which the patient was most concerned about while directing his future care). 
See generally JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRAC· 
TICE (2d ed. 2001) (suggesting that conflicts with hospital staff members and the patient's family and 
friends interfere in the overall decision-making process, especially because cases involving life-
sustaining treatment are emotionally charged and accompanied by fear of legal liabHity). Thus, pa-
tients may be reluctant to go through the trouble of creating a legal document that will not be effectu· 
ated. Another likely explanation is that patients are satisfied with what they believe (correctly or incor-
rectly) to be the default rule of family decision-making. 
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people may be less likely to execute a will if they know it may be ignored. 
The practical concern in the context of confidentiality is whether people 
win be less likely to confide sensitive information to their physician (law-
yer, mental health professional, etc.) knowing the possibility of disclosure 
postmortem. The ethical rule to maintain confidentiality, even postmor-
tem, is premised, at least in part, on the notion that such rule will result in 
the best consequences. But consequentialist (here utilitarian) arguments 
suffer from empirical difficulties72 both in predicting behavior and in de-
termining what constitutes the greatest good. On the one hand, up until 
now we have been functioning largely in the absence of specific confiden-
tiality protections postmortem73 and this has not seemed to alter patients' 
willingness to talk with their physicians. On the other hand, the same point 
may be made with respect to confidentiality protections for living pa-
tients-many states enacted explicit legislation only recently and we still 
lack a comprehensive federal framework for confidentiality. Most patients 
have no idea about the legal rules for confidentiality; they rely on (some-
times erroneous) assumptions about disclosure. This is also likely to be 
true for patients thinking about postmortem disclosure. Moreover, these 
arguments are premised on the notion that patients will think about post-
mortem confidentiality in making decisions about talking to their physi-
cians, when in reality the issue is not likely to be foremost on a patient's 
mind during a clinical encounter.74 The bottom line is that it is difficult to 
identify the practical consequences of specific confidentiality protections 
in the premortem context, let alone the postmortem one. Thus, decisions 
about which rules to enact must depend on theoretical suppositions regard-
ing patient behavior. 
Alternatively, we might construct postmortem confidentiality protec-
tions and exceptions so as to achieve a balance between individual and 
societal interests that we all would agree is appropriate (using, for exam-
ple, Rawls' social contract theory).75 Importantly, this does not suppose 
72 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
White the arguments against the survival of the [attorney-client] privilege are by no means 
frivolous, they are based in large part on speculation-thoughtful speculation, but specula-
tion nonetheless-as to whether posthumous tennination of the privilege would diminish a 
client's willingness to confide in an attorney. In an area where empirical information would 
be useful, it is scant and inconclusive. 
/d. at4l0. 
73 Most laws and ethical codes are silent on the issue, See discussion supra Part U. , 
74 As a colleague of mine noted after reading this article, she now will be forced to consider 
postmortem disclosure when she seeks medical care! This brings up an important point-if a patient 
knows with certainty that there will not be any protections, that is more likely to have an effect on 
behavior (resulting in less disclosure) than if the patient is simply unclear as to the extent of the possi· 
~~~~ ' 
75 Partridge, supra note 69, at 259. Rawls' social contract theory could be useful in this context 
RAWLS, supra note 33, at 16. 
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that there are no exceptions to confidentiality, but that exceptions must fit 
within this balance and should refl~ct the initial framework that people 
assume operates. 76 Therefore, if people generally value confidentiality 
protections that extend beyond death (or the values which confidentiality 
seeks to protect are generally understood to extend beyond death), discJo .. 
sure of information postmortem would harm people now in the same way 
they would be harmed by knowing that ·their will would be disregarded. 
This issue is not dependent on empirical evidence because the concern is 
not with what the majority of people now believe about confidentiality 
protections, but with what people in some neutral state would have agreed 
regarding confidentiality protections. Disclosing information about people 
upon their death may harm people's current interests in confidentiality not 
because those interests survive death but because the present interest in 
confidentiality extends indefinitely, or at least does not extinguish immedi-
ately upon death. In other . words, when someone considers whether to 
disclose sensitive information to a health care professional he or she as· 
sumes that the information will remain confidential and does not put any 
timeframe or limitation on that assumption. 77 
Both theories provide a basis for postmortem confidentiality protec-
tions based on the interests of current and future patients, and both allow 
for exceptions based on the goals sought to be achieved. Moreover, there 
is yet another group of interests that must be considered in this context-
those of people now living and their interests in preserving the confidenti-
ality of the specific person who has died.78 
76 This does not mean that there cannot be new exceptions, merely that the exceptions must be 
understood within the initial framework of values. 
77 See Michael H. Kottow, Medical Conftdentiality: An Intransigent and Absolute Obligation, 12 
J. MED. ETHICS 117 (1986). , 
If the death of a famous politician should prompt a physician to uncover his knowledge 
about the deceased's homosexual inclination, still living patients of the same physician 
might register with distaste and fear the possibility that private infonnation about them 
could eventually be disclosed after they died. This suspicion may well be unsettling and 
therefore hannfut to them .... 
Id. at 119. 
Following the disclosure of tapes of the poet Anne Sexton's sessions with her psychiatrist, an edi-
torial in the New York Times stressed the public's right to a system of confidentiality. Editorial, Be-
trayed: The Poet and the Public, N.Y. TIMES, July 20. 1991, at 18~. A follow-up letter noted that "even 
if Anne Sexton wanted the tapes revealed, I still say: Lock them up! Why should Sexton have the right 
to undermine trust for millions of living patients in a pitch. for immortality from the grave?" M.G. 
Lord. Editorial, Woman Talk to a Psychiatrist While an Ear on the Wall is Listening, NEWSDAY, July 
28, 1991, at 32. See generally. Sharon Carton, The Poet, the Biographer and the Shrink: Psychiatrist· 
Patient Confidentiality and the Anne Sexton Biography; 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 17 
(1993) (arguing that when psychiatrist Dr. Martin Orne revealed intimate details of his professional 
sessions with Anne Sexton, he not only harmed Sexton, but mental health patients in general who rely 
on medical confidentiality). 
78 See Kottow, supra note 77, at 19. 
Also to be considered are the negative effects a disparaging disclosure might have upon sur-
viving family members as well as groups of individuals with whom the deceased had a 
\ 
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2. Interests of Third Parties 
First, blood relatives of the deceased have an interest controlling in .. 
formation that has implications for their own health (and thus identity). 
Although the interests of blood relatives in maintaining confidentiality may 
not supercede the individual's right to control his or her medical informa-
tion during life,79 they may well be given greater weight (or at least be less 
likely to be outweighed) after that person has died. 
Second, there are more nebulous interests ofthird·parties in preventing 
the disclosure of confidential information. The dead live on in the memo-
ries of the living. Harms to the memory ofthe deceased may entail very 
real harms to people now living who have an interest in preserving the 
original memory, such as relatives or close friends of the deceased. In fact, 
interests in memory or reputation of a loved one are sometimes legally 
protected. 80 However, the idea of harm to memory once again raises ques-
tions about the extent to which someone can have a legally protected inter .. 
est in preserving memory-here a person's memory pertaining to someone 
else. The notion of harm to the identity interests of either persons previ-
ously living or the memory interests of persons now living is difficult to 
conceptualize, particularly when the issue is true, rather than false, irtfor-
mation.81 
C. Summary 
I have argued that there are a variety of interests in maintaining confi-
dentiality postmortem that must be taken into account: interests of the de-
ceased; interests of current or future patients; and interests of those close to 
the deceased. The interests of current or future patients in maintaining a 
system of confidentiality play out the same way in the postmortem context 
as. they do in the premortem one. In both situations, the values underlying 
confidentiality protections-privacy and health-must be taken into ac-
count. This notion is discussed in the context of evaluating the strength of 
ld. 
commonality of interests~ Death does not cancel the obligation of confidentiality which re-
mains of import to all survivors within the radius of interests of the deceased. 
79 As a practical matter, relatives of a living patient cannot prevent the patie~t from sharing in-
formation about him or herself, even if that information has personal implications for the relative in 
question. 
80 Potentially through a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress due to statements made 
about a deceased relative. ·See SO AM. JUR. 2o Libel and Slander § 356 ( 1995). 
81 We tend to give less protection to disclosures of true information than disclosure of false in-
formation. For example, a defense to a suit for libel or slander is that the information in question is 
true. But see discussion supra note 60 (discussing the potential hann to identity from infonnation that 
is true, but requires additional information in order .to be understood in context; and that. additional 
information may no longer be available after the person had died). 
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the interest in disclosure. 82 The identity interests of the deceased and the 
memory interests of those close to the deceased are linked-memory inter-
ests are those interests in identity that remain after the individual has died. 
These two aspects are considered below as part of the discussion of the 
sensitivity of the information in question.83 Finally, the interests of blood 
relatives in maintaining the confidentiality of information pertaining to 
their health has implications for family involvement in determinations re-
garding disclosure. 84 It is to the evaluation of these issues that I now tum. 
IV. CONFIDENTIALITY VERSUS DISCLOSURE 
Given that there are interests in maintaining confidentiality postmor-
tem, it might seem prudent simply to require strict confidentiality after 
death. But such a system is as unpalatable as one in which all information 
is disclosed. freely upon a patient's death. There are clearly interests that 
weigh in favor of disclosure of information. Even for living patients, con-
fidentiality protections are not absolute. Determining the extent of protec-
tions in the postmortem context entails a weighing of the interests in main-
taining confidentiality against the interests in disclosure. If disclosure does 
not harm the values we seek to promote by maintaining confidentiality 
(such as privacy or health), then it should be permitted. Likewise, if dis-
closure promotes the values better than confidentiality, it should be pennit-
ted.85 
A. What Factors to Consider? 
There are two factors to consider: (1) the strength of the interest(s) in 
disclosure; and (2) the strength of the interest in confidentiality. The first 
factor is essentially an inquiry into the reasons why the information is 
sought. The second factor I break into two parts: (a) the sensitive or per-
sonal nature of the information; and (b) the· time elapsed· since the individ .. 
ual' s death. Each of these will be considered in turn. 
82 See discussion supra Part Ill.A. l . 
83 See discussion supra Part IU.A.2. 
84 See discussion supra Part UI.B.2. 
85 As stated previously, one difficulty that has always existed in deontological theories is how to 
balance competing values, principles or maxims. See discussion supra note 31. ·Thus, if confidentiality 
is designed to promote both privacy and health (by encouraging disclosure), in the situation where one 
of these will be better promoted by disclosure (health) and one by confidentiality (privacy) there is no 
way to reconcile the conflict Consequentialist theories aUow us to weigh the two in light of an exter-
nal measure (for example, greatest good). So if more good is produced by favoring health over pri-
vacy, disclosure would be allowed. But even without resorting to such utilitarian analysis, we might 
argue that as a· general matter our society places value on both privacy and health, and comes out in 
favor of one or the other depending on the imposition into privacy versus the imposition into health. 
For example, privacy protections allow people to do as they wish with respect to their own health, but 
not with respect to the health of others. 
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1. Why Is the Information Sought? 
are a variety of reasons why confidential medical information 
may be sought after a patient's death. These include: inquiries by family 
members seeking information pertaining to their own health; information 
sought by public health authorities; biomedical researchers seeking to pro-
mote societal health; and information sought for general interest (such as 
by media or biographers). What weight should we accord these interests? 
If a primary purpose of confidentiality protections is to promote health-
by encouraging patients to convey information to their physicians to help 
in diagnosis and treatment-then it should be permissible for the health 
professional to share the information when health needs ,are better met by 
disclosure.86 This is true particularly when the patient in question is 
deceased.87 For living patients' there is a general presumption that health 
needs will be better met through confidentiality (because protections will 
encourage patients to communicate freely with their physicians), even 
though some third parties may find the information useful for ·their own 
medical care. Nonetheless, there are a number of exceptions permitting 
disclosure of confidential medical information of living patients for public 
86 At issue here is the use of identifiable information. Confidentiality concerns the individual's 
ability to keep infonnation that has been disclosed from being shared with other people. The protection 
is not with respect to the information itself, but its link to the individual. Thus it does not make sense 
to talk about the confidentiality of anonymous information, except to the extent that there are security 
concerns relating to whether or not the information can be linked back to the individuals in question. 
For example, the federal guidelines governing research specifically exempt from institutional review 
board evaluation (and thus the federal requirements such as informed consent) "[r]esearch, involving 
the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic 
specimens ... ifthe·information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjeCts cannot 
be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects." 45 C.P.R. § 46.10l(b)(4) (2000). 
Even if there is no breach of confidentiality, there may be a violation of other rights. For exam5 
ple, consider the case of a .patient who refuses to participate in research because he or she does not 
approve or agree with the goals of the project (as may occur in some cases of gender or race-based 
research). Using that person's medical information against their previously expressed wishes would 
frustrate this desire. 
87 There are arguments made that in certain circumstances disclosure of information to close fam-
ily members may harm the individual seeking the information. l reject this argument, particularly with 
respect to information sought for health purposes. Studies regarding informed consent disclosures, for 
example, suggest that sharing health information with patients generaUy is nothannful. PRESIDENT'S 
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND BBHAV. REs., MAKING 
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE 
PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 75 (1982). In general, informed consent should function as an 
adequate safeguard in these circumstances. Thus., individuals wishing to discover certain information 
might receive counseling regarding the potential implications of the information-as is done for most 
genetic testing nowadays-before disclosure is appropriate. 
There is a separate question about whether information that does not pertain to health status can 
be harmful. Consider the example in the introduction regarding the son seeking information from the 
therapist-what if the mother had indeed sought counseling due to problems stemming from her rela-
tionship with the son? Information sought for these types of purposes will be considered below under 
the heading of general interest. 
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or individual health needs. 88 While there have long been reporting statutes 
for communicable diseases, more recently there has been discussion of a 
physician's duty to disclose genetic information to Jspecific at-risk indi-
viduals. 89 At least one state recognizes the likelihood that family members 
will seek genetic information for health reasons after a patient's death, and 
88 For example, the Department of Health and Human Services' proposed regulations governing 
confidentiality of medical information explicitly allow disclosure without patient authorization for 
public health purposes as well as for law enforcement purposes. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,538 (Dec. 28, 
2000). The most common examples where public health concerns outweigh individual rights of confi-
dentiality are from the contagious disease cases. A number of states have legislation requiring disclo-
sure of specific diseases such as sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), HIV/AIDS, or general commu-
nicable diseases such as tuberculosis and syphilis. Disclosure to public health authorities, People ex 
rei. Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815, 819 (Ill. 1922), other medical care providers, (Davis v. Rod-
man, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (Ark. 1921), partners, DiMarco v, Lynch Homes..Chester County, Inc., 583 
A.2d 422.425 (Pa. 1990). family, Skillings v. Allen. 173 N.W. 663,664 (Minn. 1919), or even needle 
sharers, HAW. Rev. STAT. ANN.§ 325-101(4)(A}(B) (Michie 2000), may be required. 
89 L.J. Deftos, Genomic Torts: The Law of the Future-The Duty of Physicians to Disclose the 
Presence of a Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients with the Disease, 32 U.S.F.L. Rev. 
1 OS, It 1-32 ( 1997) (noting the general law of duty and the specific duty of physicians to reveal the 
presence of a genetic disease to the:: relatives of their patients with such a disease); Janet A. Kobrin, 
Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REv: 1283, 1285 (1983) (discussing the issue of 
disclosure to third parties and .. how current legislative schemes and case law suggests that a counselor 
bas an affirmative duty to inform appropriate third parties of certain diagnoses"); Angela Liang, The 
Argument Against a Physician's Duty to Warn for Genetic Diseases: The Conflicts Created by Safer v. 
Estate of Pack, 1 J. HEALTH CAREL. & PoL'Y 437,437 (1998) (arguing that the decision by the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey requiring physicians to warn individuals known to be at risk from a geneti-
cally transmissible condition "has created serious implications for a patient's privacy rights. patient-
physician confidentiality, as well as a patient's health and safety"); Sonia M. Suter, Whose Genes Are 
These Anyway? Familial Conflicts Over Access to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1854, 1856 
(1994) (arguing that courts and legislatures should not permit disclosure of a person's genetic informa-
tion to third parties and that genetic teSting for the benefrt of a third party cannot be constitutionally 
mandated). 
Some states have specific confidentiality statutes addressing genetic information. CAL. CIV. 
CODE§§ S6.l7(a)-(d) (West Supp. 2001) (prohibiting health care service plans from willfully or negli-
gently disclosing the results of a genetic test without written permission); GA. CODE ANN.§ 33-S4-3(b) 
(Harrison 1998) (restricting insurer from seeking information derived from a genetic test); ME. REv. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 19302 (West Supp. 2001)• 
An employer may not fail. or refuse to hire, discharge or otherwise discriminate against an 
employee or applicant for employment with respect to the compensation, terms or condi-
tions of employment on the basis of genetic information concerning that individual or be-
cause ofthe individual's refusal to submit to a genetic test or make available the results of a 
genetic test or on the basis that the individual received a genetic test or genetic counseling, 
except when based on a bor.a fide occupatior.al qualification. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. titS § 19302 (West Supp. 2001); Act of June 21, 2000, ch. 304, 2000 N.H. 
Laws 141-H:2 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 141-H:2) (Michie 1955 & Supp. 2000) 
(stating that no person shall disclose to any other person that an individual has Wldergone genetic testing or the 
results of a test). But cf. N.M~ STAT. ANN. § 24-21-30 (Michie 1978) (exempting insurers from general 
confidentiality regulations if the use of genetic analysis or genetic infonnation for underwriting purposes is 
based on sound actuarial principles or related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience). 
Despite the fact that genetic information may be useful to third parties, this is true of many other 
types of medical information and thus it is not clear that it should be treated differently than· medical 
information in general, which is usually kept confidential during the individual's lifetime, except to the 
extent that it has serious health implications for Other people (for example, contagious diseases). See 
Suter, supra, at 1870-88. 
2001] POSTMORTEM CONFIDENTIALITY 103 //. 
authorizes disclosure. 90 1 
''Health" is a broad category.91 In the premortem context, th~ concept 
is expansive enough to include disclosure for protection of public safety 
and of vulnerable persons. Health needs are likely to fall along a contin-
uum with some information having direct health implications-such as 
information that a parent died of a potentially inheritable disease-and 
other information having less direct impact-such as the information that a 
parent was a carrier of a particular gene that may or may not have been 
;_*"passed on.92 
The strongest argument for disclosure can be made when an individual 
(or individuals) will potentially obtain direct health benefits from the in-
formation. But there are also cases, such as disclosure for biomedical re-
search purposes, which may result in a better understanding of the disease 
90 S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-30(4) (West Supp. 2000) (permitting a deceased individual's confi· 
dential genetic infonnation to be disclosed when it will assist in medical diagnosis of blood relatives of 
the decedent). 
Other states have statutes addressing access to medical information by adoptees regarding their 
biological parents. D. Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil: A Blueprint for Legisla-
tive Reform of the Disclosure of Health-Related Iriformation in Adoption, 10 N.C. L. REv. 681, 735 
( 1992). Some, like Missouri, allow the adopted child to access information about their deceased bio-
logical parent if the parent has left explicit instructions to this effect. or, in the absence of such instruc-
tions, if a court finds that the information is "necessary for health-related purposes." Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 453.121 (West 2000). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7504-1.2 (West 1981) (noting in the 
comments that medical information about ancestors may be critical to medical treatment or childbearQ 
ing decisions); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 162.416(b) (Vernon 1999) (allowing disclosure only in cases 
where the decedent specifically authorized postmortem release of the information). Other states simply 
allow identifying information to be released if the biological parent is deceased. MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 
42-6-104(6) (1999) (stating that the court may order disclosure of identifYing information to the peti-
tioner if the person being sought is deceased). And still other states allow only information regarding 
the identity of the deceased biological parent to be disclosed. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2905(c)(3) 
(Purdons 1998 & Supp. 200 I) (stating that if one biological parent is deceased his or her identity may 
be disclosed, however, requiring the consent of the living biological parent prior to disclosure). 
91 lt is less clear whether physicians have the same ethical responsibility to protect public safety 
as they do public health. As a result, mandatory reporting statutes. in this context may be more prob-
lematic from an ethical standpoint On the other hand, because "health .. is such an expansive concept. 
it often is difficult to distinguish between concerns about public health and public safety. Many states 
have reporting statutes for injuries from criminal behavior, injuries from alcohol, motor vehicle im-
pairments, and bums. Ohio, for example, .has a statute mandating the reporting of drug abuse when the 
individual in question is a public transportation employee. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.33 (Ander-
son 1998). New Jersey requires physicians to report cases of epilepsy to the Department of Motor 
Vehicles. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 39:3-10.4(West 1970). 
Furthermore, although physicians (aiong with oilier professionals) have at least some responsibil-
ity to safeguard vulnerable persons, it is not clear whether this duty extends to the general public, or 
whether it should outweigh individual confidentiality protections. With respect to minorsf however, 
these protections are generally thought to be appropriate. Almost aU states have child abuse reporting 
statutes. Missouri specifically requires physicians to report drug dependent minors to the health de-
partment. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 191.737 (West 2000). New Jersey expands the requirement to all drug 
dependent patients. N.J; STAT. ANN.§ 24:21-39 (West 1970). In addition, some states have statutes 
that require reporting of abuse of hospital patients or long-term care patients, elder. abuse, spousal 
abuse, and domestic abuse. 
92 ln essence some of these questions will reduce to comparisons of risk probabilities. 
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in question and, thus, development of treatments-potential indirect health 
benefits. 93 Here the is not disclosure to a particular individual, but 
disclosure to an investigator (or perhaps allowing access to medical re-
cords). If confidentiality protections are supposed to promote health, then 
exceptions should be permitted to the extent that they better promote 
health. The closer the link between the rationale for disclosure and the 
promotion of health, the stronger the argument for disclosure. Alterna-
tively, one can think of this in terms of the interests involved. The interest 
in obtaining direct health benefits (for example, information that pertains 
to current ameliorative health care) is stronger than the interest in obtaining 
indirect health benefits (for example, information that will be used in a 
study to gain knowledge about a hereditary disease). Therefore, the bal-
ance may come out differently. As a result, disclosure should be permitted 
in most cases where the information has the potential to directly affect a 
person's health. Disclosure for research purposes, which has the potential 
indirectly to benefit health, will be somewhat more limited. 
A number of state laws explicitly carve out an exception to confidenti-
ality restrictions for living patients allowing access to medical records for 
research purposes. 94 In addition, the federal regulations restricting the 
93 I refer here to health~related research (as opposed to social research, although that may also 
have health implications). I include information sought for quality assurance purposes. Other types of 
research, such as the research conducted by a biographer, are dealt with under the heading of "general 
interest." Not all health-related research may be categorized as beneficial. For example, there could be 
health-related research purposes that are.objectionable (and thought to be potentially harmful), such as 
showing differences in intellectual capacity between different races. I assume for purposes of this 
analysis that we are discussing research with potential health benefits (and that the research has met all 
ethical guidelines), To the extent that particular research is not thought to be beneficial, the balance in 
favor of confidentiality is likely to be stronger. 
As noted previously, the issue here is disclosure of identifiable information. Moreover, disclosure 
is only to investigators (or, in some cases, investigators gain access to the medical records). 
94 See R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 5·37.3-4(b)(3) (1999) (permitting qualified personnel, conducting scien-
tific research, access to health care providers • eonfldential patient records without patient consent 
provided that any research report shall not identify, directly or indirectly, the patient's identity); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 42.48.020 (West l999)(permitting a state agency to disclose confidential patient 
records to researchers provided that a human research review board determines: ( 1) the disclosure 
request has scientific merit; (2) that the research purposes cannot be reasonably accomplished without 
disclosure of patient records in individually identifiable form; and (3) that the remaining risks are 
outweighed by anticipated health, safety, or scientific benefits, and the researcher enters into an agree-
ment that: (a) establishes safeguards for the continued confidentiality of the patient identifiable records; 
(b) restricts the use of patients' visual representations; and (c) requires the researcher to destroy patient 
identifying information associated with the research report as soon as the purposes of the research 
project have been accomplished). See also ROACH, supra note 10, at 123-27. Likewise, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services promulgated confidentiality regulations allowing disclosure with-
out patient authorization for research purposes. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2000). 
In fact, access to confidential medical records by researchers is often permitted by state statues-
many of which require not that the information be stripped of its identity before access. but that the end 
results (report or publishable article) not directly or indirectly identify the patient. States vary in the 
degree to which they require assurances or additional safeguards before permitting access. See CA. 
CIVIL CODE§ 56.10(c)(7) (West 1982) (allowing disclosure for "bona fide research projects"); COLO. 
REV. STAT~ ANN.§ 6-18-103 (West 2000) (permitting disclosure for .. bona fide research projects," but 
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requiring that disclosures be restricted .. to the minimum amount of information necessary to accom-
plish the purpose for which the information is being disclosed"); 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 2000-160 § 79 
(codified as amended at FL. STAT. ANN. § 455.667(d)) (allowing disclosure for research "provided the 
information is abstracted in such a way as to protect the identity or the patient or provided written 
permission is received from the patient or patient's legal representative); HAW. REv. STAT. 323c-37 
(Michie 1993) (stating that research must be approved by IRB and include a "realistic plan for main-
taining the confidentiality of protected health information," moreover, a researcher must "remove and 
destroy, at earliest opportunity consistent with the purposes of the project involved, any information 
that would enable an individual to be identified"); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-39-5-3 (Michie Supp. 2000) 
(approving, generaUy, disclosure for research, but requiring that "each party that receives information 
from a health record ... shall protect the confidentiality of the health record and may not disclose the 
patient's identity ... "); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 171 1-C (West 2000) (requiring IRB approval of 
the research); Mo. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN.§ 4-305 (Michie 2000) (allowing disclosure for educa-
tional or research purposes. as long as such purposes are "subject to the applicable requirements of an 
institutional review board"); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 14-6-i (Michie 1995) (allowing publication of statis--
tical studies and reports based on medical records provided they do not directly or indirectly identify 
individual patients); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (1999) (explicitly stating that no patient consent is 
necessary as long as the researcher does not identify the individual); VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-127.1:03 
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 2000) (stating that no person to whom diselosure of patient records was made 
shall redisclose or otherwise reveal the records of the patient without first obtaining the patient's con-
sent to such redisclosure); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63-2-202(8)(a)(i)-(iii) (1997) (allowing a governmental 
entity to disclose or authorize disclosure if "the research cannot reasonably be accomplished without .. 
. disclosure." "the research is bona fide and, ... the value of the research outweighs· the infringement 
upon personal privacy," the researcher assures the confidentiality of the records and removes/destroys 
individual identifiers as soon as possible); WASH. REV. CooEANN. § 70.02.050 (1 )(g}(i) (West 1997 & 
Supp. 2001) (requiring the IRB to evaluate whether the research "is of sufficient importance to out-
weigh the intrusion into the privacy of the patient," "is impractical without individually identifiable 
information, •• "contains reasonable safeguards to prevent redisclosure," and "contains procedures to 
remove or destroy at the earliest opportunity" identifiable information); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.82 
(West 1997) (allowing disclosure only if the researcher is affiliated with health care provider, and 
allows private pay patients to sign form denying access, annually); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-609 
(2001) (permitting disclosure without patient's authorization for use in a research project provided that rea-
sonable safeguards are taken to protect against identifying any patient in any report of the research project). 
Minnesota is one of the few states that explicitly requires patient notification of potential disclo-
sure. MlNN. STAT. ANN.§ J44.335(d)(2)(i)(West 1998 & Supp. 2001) ("[T]he provider must disclose 
in writing to patients currently being treated by the provider that health records, regardless of when 
generated, may be released and that the patient may object, in which case the records will not be re-
leased."). See also WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 146.82 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001). Some states even allow 
research disclosure of particularly sensitive medical information. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.845 (2000) 
(mental health records if .. bona fide" research); COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (Bradford 2000) 
(information from genetic testing); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-l46g(a) (2001) (psychiatric records and 
communications); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 381.004 (West Supp. 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:213.7 
(West Supp. 2001) (genetic information if anonymous research); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 19203 
(West 1999) (HIV, if stripped of its identity before disclosing to the researcher); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit 34-B § 1207 (West 1999) (mental health records); MD. CODE ANN., INS.§ 27-909 (Michie Supp. 
2000) (genetic infornwtion if research approved by IRB); MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 330.1748 (Michie 1999) 
(mental health records, but only if"identification is essential in order to achieve the purpose for which 
the information is sought or if preventing the identification would clearly be impractical, but not if the 
subject of the information is likely to be harmed by the identification"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-
166 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375-1309 (West Supp. 2001); (HIV disclosure); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
630.140 (West 2001) (mental health records); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:.5C-8 (West 2000) (HIV record if 
research approved by IRB); OR. REv. STAT. § 179.505 4(b) (1999) (menta1 health records, except 
requires the information to be de-identified unless "disclosure is essential to the research ... or when 
the disclosure benefits the provider or patient"); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 40.1-5~26 (Michie 1997) (mental 
health records). Other states have generic authorizations for disclosure by public health or other gov-
ernmental agencies. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-38-4-11 {Michie 1993) {but requires additional safe-
guards); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. l n, § 1 tt B (West 2000) (requiring that research studies not 
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conduct of research do not apply to research involving dead people, or the 
use of information from dead people.95 Nevertheless, it may be appropriate 
to require an Institutional Review Board (IRB) review and approval 
research in this context, particularly since informed consent will not func-
tion as a safeguard for individual interests. 96 When the potential harm is 
minimal (considering both the potential link of information back to the 
deceased and the possible implications of that link), the interests in pro-
moting general societal health through research may prevail. 
In addition to information sought for direct and indirect health pur-
poses, information about a deceased patient may also be sought for general 
interest, either because the individual in question is a public figure97 (for 
example, the example of Linda McCartney from the introduction), or be-
cause the information is of particular interest to the public98 (for example, a 
story about a series of deaths from a particular disease) or to a particular 
individual (for example, the psychotherapist example described in the in-
identify the subjects of the reports or records); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § l-55L 1-1 (West 1981) (requiring 
additional safeguards). 
Allowing access to confidential infonnation does not mean that there is no ethical obligation to 
obtain informed consent (a separate question), but that there is no breach of confidentiality based on 
disclosure for research. As a practical matter, the two issues (confidentiality and informed consent for 
research participation) reduce into one-when access to records is authorized by statute is it unlikely 
that a researcher wiJl seek infonned conSent from each patient. 
95 45 C.F.R. § 46.10t(a) (2000) (stating that the regulations apply to "research involving human 
subjects"); id. § 46.102( f) (defining a human subject as a "living individual"). 
96 For example, the proposed Health and Human Services medical privacy regulations authorize 
the disclosure of information regarding living patients to researchers without consent, as long as au-
thorization is obtained from an IRB or privacy board. The IRB or board would have to determine that: 
The use or disclosure ... involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects; 
The waiver ... will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects; 
The research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver ... ; 
Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional ... inform[ation] 
after participation; 
The research would be impracticable to conduct without the [waiver]; 
The research project is of sufficient importance to outweigh the intrusion intQ the 
privacy of the individual whose information would be disclosed; 
There is an adequate plan to protect the identifiers ... ; and 
There is an adequate plan to destroy the identifiers at the earliest opportunity consis-
tent with conduct of the research, unless there is a health or .research justification for 
retaining the identifiers. 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infonnation, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,969 
(Nov, 3, 1999)(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160-64). 
97 Jonas B. Robitscher, Doctors' Privileged Communications, Public Life, and History's Rights, 
17 CLEV-MAR. L. REv. 199 (1968) (arguing that physicians should be allowed to write about dead 
celebrities). 
98 Consider the argument of Anne Sexton •s biographer regarding access to her psychiatric tran-
scripts: 
Those of us responsible for deciding what should go into the book-heirs, doctor, publisher, 
author-were acutely aware of the moral complexities. Yet it seemed to us that the tapes 
provided a historical-record of the processes by which a human being had survived a mental 
illness by turning her treatment into an education in the service of art 
Diane Middlebrook, The Poet's Art Mined the Patient's Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1991, at A3. 
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troduction).99 The arguments in favor of disclosure are weakest in this 
context. Allowing disclosure in cases of health needs fits well within the 
ethical rationales described earlier. 100 First, under a Rawlsian (or other 
deontological) perspective, it is likely that society, in general, would favor 
a system in which health values are promoted by permitting disclosure 
under these circumstances. 101 Second, under a utilitarian ( consequentialist) 
analysis the greatest good is served by a11owing disclosure (in light of the 
harms to the deceased from disclosure, the potential benefit to 
health, and the improbability that such limited disclosures would seriously 
undermine the system of confidentiality}.102 Although there is still a ques-
tion about empirical impact, there is no evidence thus far that the excep~ 
tions allowing disclosure of health-related information which function with 
respect to living patients (most of which are based on a public health or 
safety rationale) have altered patients' overall willingness to communicate 
with their physicians. 
It is more difficult to justify exceptions in cases of disclosure for gen-
eral interest. The consequences of allowing access to personal medical 
information merely because of individual or public interest would very 
likely undermine the goals of confidentiality protections, and it is not clear 
that· the potential benefits of such knowledge would outweigh the potential 
hanns to health. Moreover, the societal value in question is knowledge 
generally, a value that often loses out to the . value our society places on 
personal privacy. For example, many jurisdictions recognize a tort law 
cause of action for "public disclosure of private. facts,"103 but all explicitly 
limit the cause of action based on the "newsworthiness" of the informa .. 
tion. 104 Yet disclosure of a person's medical. history, regardless of news• 
worthiness, is often restricted. The rationale is that medical information is 
particularly sensitive, and thus private, information. 
In fact, disclosure of identifiable personal medical information for pur-
poses of general interest should be rare. Cases in which disclosure is ap-
propriate should be limited to those in which the interests in maintaining 
99 In this category, I include infonnation sought for non-health related research (for example, 
demographic data). To t;e extent that the information in question is deeidentified, t!te analysis will 
look similar to that for de-identified infonnation sought for health-related research purposes. For 
identifiable infonnation, the physician must balance the elements identified below. 
100 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
101 See discussion supra note 33 and accompanying text 
102 See discussion supra note 37 and accompanying text 
103 
REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 6S2D (1977). 
104 Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A. Farewell to Warren. and Brandeis's 
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 300 (1983). The courts are extremely reluctant to find in favor 
of confidentiality over the public's interest in reporting of the news and very few claims can survive the 
newsworthiness defense. Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Resurrecting a Sunken Ship: An Analysis of Current 
Judicial Attitudes toward Public Disclosure Claims, 38 Sw. L.J.l 151. 1152 (1985). 
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confidentiality are extremely weak. The following section discusses how 
to evaluate interests in maintaining confidentiality. 
2. How Strong an Interest in Confidentiality? 
Although the strength of the interest in, disclosure is an important fac-
tor, one must also consider the strength of the interest in confidentiality. 
Part II of this Article discusses three types of interests in maintaining con-
fidentiality postmortem. In the previous section, I considered the balance 
between the interests of current and future patients in maintaining general 
confidentiality protections postmortem, and the interests served by disclo-
sure. In this section, I address the notion of a harm to identity or memory 
in more detail, focusing on two factors-the sensitivity of the information 
sought and the time elapsed since death. Each of these will be discussed in 
tum. 
a. Sensitivity 
Sensitivity is defined here as the extent to which the information is 
linked to the identity of the individual. For example, one part of the 
evaluation for the "public disclosure of private facts" tort noted above en-
tails consideration of the extent to which the information is embarrass-
ing. 105 Many courts state that, in order to make out a claim, the plaintiff 
must show from the outset that the fact in question "concem[s] a matter 
that would be embarrassing or demeaning to a reasonable person."106 
The idea of embarrassment, although stated in the law in terms of a 
hypothetical reasonable person, is a very subjective notion. Someone may 
be embarrassed by facts about private life based on a number of factors, 
which include personal beliefs about the meaning of those facts, as well as 
a current job or position in the community, and the individuals to whom 
the information is disclosed. 107 For example, blood type may not be 
lOS RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 6520, cmt. h (1977). 
106 DeLaTorre, supra note 104, at 1177. Although some facts in the patient's medical record will 
meet this standard, many will not. 
It is interesting to note that the two aspects may be linked. Thus the more "newsworthy" disclo-
sures may concern more intimate details of a person's life. But newsworthiness in this sense (otherwise 
known as titillation factor) is not truly the issue with respect to disclosure of confidential medical 
infonnation. Rather the concern is with the importance to the public {or individual).in knowing the 
infonnation as it pertains to their ability to make choices about their lives. 
107 For example, while working in a video store one summer during high school, I rented an adult 
film to my allergist before he recognized me and hastily left the store. His embarrassment may have 
stemmed from the type of film he was renting, or perhaps simply the fact that he was a physician,. and 
in particular. my physician (or maybe just known to me). In general. public disclosure will be the most 
problematic and the more limited the disclosures, the easier they are to justify. But in other situations, 
even individual disclosure may be inappropriate, especially where the individual in question is exactly 
the person with whom the deceased. did not want to share the infonnation. For example, a patient may 
not object to disclosing information about her general frustrations as a parent in a biography, but object 
to sharing information about her negative feelings toward one of her children with that child. 
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thought to be particularly personal information in most cases, but may be-
come so if paternity is in question. Although the subjective nature of judg-
ing sensitivity might seem to argue in favor of applying a subjective stan .. 
dard to detennine disclosure (for example, would the deceased have con-
sidered this bit of information more or less personal), there are a number of 
difficulties in applying a so-called "substituted judgment standard" to de-
ceased individuals. 108 The notion of embarrassment is likewise difficult to 
to deceased individuals, and thus the issue is reduced to the relation-
ship between the information and the memory of the deceased. The closer 
the link between the information and the individual's memory or identity~ 
the more concern we should have about disclosure. Where an individual 
has specifically instructed the physician to keep certain infonnation confi-
dential after death (or specifically instructed the physician to not disclose 
to family members during his lifetime), one might presume that the patient 
considers the information to be an integral part of his identity. 
In situations where there is no guidance from the patient, the physician 
might look for guidance in determining sensitivity to general societal stan-
dards drawn from some of the laws that exist in this area. Although most 
state laws are silent on the issue of confidentiality protections for deceased 
individuals, the statutes that do exist often focus on information that might 
be considered particularly sensitive. Thus. some states have. statutes assert-
ing that HIV or AIDS information should remain confidential after 
death. 109 Others address such issues as child abuse, 110 elder abuse, 111 men-
108 See discussion infra note 135-36 and accompanying text 
109 GA. CODE ANN. § 31-21-3 (Harrison 1998) (requiring HIV information contained in dead 
body disposition notification to be confidential and privileged); IND. CODE ANN.§ 16-41-13-3 (Michie 
1993) (requiring HIV information contained in dead body disposition notification to be confidential); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2438 (1992) (requiring HIV information contained in dead body disposition 
notification to be confidential); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-5-9 (Michie 1996) (requiring HIV information 
contained in dead body disposition notification to be confidential and privileged); VA. CODE ANN. § 
54.1-2807.1 {Michie 1998) (restricting any person practicing funeral services from disclosing infonna-
tion concerning the deceased's infectious disease). Some statutes extend the duty of confidentiality to 
funeral home personnel. See also N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 26:5C-l2 (West 1996) (permitting an executor, 
administrator of the estate, authorized representative, the deceased's spouse, family members, and the 
health commissioner to consent for release·of a deceased person's HIV reeord under the state's AIDS 
program). 
110 ALASKA STAT.§ 12.65.140 (Michie 2000) (requiring state child fatality review team to main-
tain the confidentiality of accessed state medical examiner records unless disclosure is necessary to 
enable the team to carry.out its duties); Mo. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. I§ 5-708(c) (Michie 2000) 
(restricting disclosure of information regarding a deceased child, family members, or suspected perpe-
trator of abuse at a public meeting); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4328.280 (Michie 2000) (stating reports 
and information concerning a suspected child's death from abuse are confidential); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 74.13.515 (West 2001) (allowing secretary of social and health services to remove personally 
identifying infonnation from public reports if disclosure of the name of a deceased child is contrary to 
the best interests of the child's siblings or other children in the household). 
111 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 173.20(BHC) (Anderson 1999) (granting a state ombudsman access 
to the records of deceased long~tenn care patient if there is no estate administrator or the ombudsman 
has reason to believe that the patient's attorney or guardian is not acting in the best interests of the 
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tal health, 112 and sexual assaults.• 13 For some particularly sensitive infor-
mation, the strongest for disclosure (for example, potentially 
life-threatening health needs) will suffice to override confidentiality, ab~ 
sent an indication that the patient would have wanted the information 
closed. 
b. Timing 
The importance of the information and its link to identity (or personal 
nature) are two crucial factors in determining whether to disclose. There is 
a third factor, however, that is linked to the .other two, and that is time. 
Both identity and memory. interests attenuate over time. Memory exists in 
the minds of survivors; it fades and alters over time. 114 Memories in the 
minds of people. who actually knew the deceased are more relevant than 
those that remain over subsequent generations. Thus, although the notion 
of confidentiality itself does not have a built"' in time limit, the interests it 
protects in this context (that of memory or identity) may well change over 
time. In particular, the interests of family members in maintaining the 
memory of the deceased attenuate over time. Thus while disclosures about 
Thomas Jefferson's relationship with Sally Hemings may have been scan-
dalous soon after his death, their "privacy" was less of an issue when dis-
closed recently. Likewise, the currently living descendants of Jefferson (or 
Hemings) had few grounds to argue that their memory of their ancestor 
was harmed. In considering whether disclosure is appropriate, the time 
elap$ed since the individual's death is particularly relevant. 
Confidentiality protections should decrease over time, eventually dis-
appearing. One possibility is simply to end all protections for confidential-
ity within a set time frame-perhaps one or two generations past the indi-
vidual's life or death. us To make things easy, we might simply pick a set 
patient). 
112 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 00-163 § 394.4615(1) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
394.461 5{ 1)) (permitting personal representative or family member to consent to release of decedent's 
state held mental health records); Ac~ of June 2, 2000. No. 91~726, § 110/10 {codified as amended at 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/10(10)) (requiring records and communications of a deceased mental 
health patient must be limited to· the factual circumstances of the incident being investigated when they 
are disclosed to a coroner); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 40.1-24.5-ll(d) (Michie 1997) (requiring personal repre-
sentative, surviving spouse, or kindred oftbe closest degree to consent,to reiease of a deceased's confi-
dential mental health information from mental health community residences). 
lll TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 44.073 (Vernon 2001) {requiring personal represeJtta-
tive to consent to release of confidential information held by state sexual assault prevention and crisis 
services). 
114 This may not always be true-in some cases an individual might become a legend in family 
folklore and unexpected revelations may be particularly devastating to this memory. Even so, the hann 
to people who did not know the deceased personally (or perhaps even know other people who knew the 
deceased personally) is Jess relevant. 
115 We could borrow from the Rule Against Perpetuities and allow confidenti~lity protections to 
remain for a life in being at the time of the patient's death, plus a certain number of years to ensure we 
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number of years, that would assure the information would only be dis-
closed after aU people who actually knew the deceased had themselves 
died. Given increased life spans, perhaps a number like eighty or 1 00 
years after death would be attractive. For example, copyright law protects 
original works of authorship for the author's life plus seventy years after 
his or her death. 116 The seventy-year time span is thought to represent two 
generations (the author's children and grandchildren).117 In Alabama, vital 
records become unrestricted public information after 125 years from the 
birth of the individual or twenty-five years after death.118 Access is per-
missible before this time period has elapsed for family members, the legal 
representative( a), and "[o]thers ... if they can demonstrate that the infor-
mation ... is needed for the determination or protection of his or her per-
sonal or property right."119 Alaska continues the protection for 100 years 
after birth or fifty years after death, as do Florida and Idaho. 120 Arizona 
extends the protection for seventy-five years after birth or ten years after 
death. 121 
Time limitations for confidentiality protections are supported by other 
laws that protect postmortem interests. The most obvious general body of 
law involving the legal interests of the dead is estate law. Estate law var· 
ies, but generally stands for the proposition that an individual may control 
the disposition of property accumulated during life after his or her death. 
Although individuals may determine the disposition of their worldly goods 
after their death, the ability to maintain control is limited. In particular, the 
Rule Against Perpetuities (and the related Rules Against Accumulations, 
limiting duration of trusts, etc.) restrict an individual's ability to control the 
disposition of property beyond a certain time period~ommonly under-
stood as a life in being plus twenty-one years. 122 The Rule itself is fairly 
are beyond the relevant lifespan of one or two subsequent generations. See discussion ilifra note 122 
and accompanying text · 
116 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). Although there were a variety of reasons why Congress amended 
initial copyright protections to allow longer protections, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134-35 (1976), the 
primary reason appears to be compliance with the Berne Convention, which detennines copyright 
protection for European Union countries, H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998). 
117 Joseph A. Lavigne, For Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer Via the Copyrights Term 
Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 311, 359 (1996) (arguing that the seventy year 
extension is not justifiable since there is no good basis for according protections to two generations of 
the author's descendants). 
118 ALA. CODE§ 22~9A-2l(t) (1999) 
119 Id. § 22-9A-2l(b)(4). 
120 ALASKA STAT.§ 18.50.310(f) (Michie 2000). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 382.025(l)(a){4), 
(2)(a)(3)(b) (West 1998) (birth records are confidential for one hundred years; certificates are confiden-
tial for fifty years after death}; IDAHO CODE § 39·270(e) (1999) (certificates and records in the custody 
of the state are confidential for one hundred years after birth; fifty years after death). 
121 Act of March 29, 2000, ch. 88, § 36-302(8) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
302(8)). 
122 For example, a testator may write a will leaving his estate to A for life and then A's future 
/ 
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specific and potentiality confusing to apply. However, it might be taken to 
support the general proposition that although people can exert some control 
over their property after death, they cannot do so for an indefinite period of 
time into the future. 123 Thus, an individual may control the disposition of 
his or her property for at least one and possibly two generations, but no 
further. 124 
It is important to stress that ending protections after a set time period 
does not mean that the information becomes public, merely that the protec-
tions cease to operate. As a practical matter, after such time has passed, it 
may be difficult both to uncover particular information, and to prevent its 
disclosure. In most cases, the physician or other custodian of the informa-
tion will no longer be living, and thus the question is really about the dis-
position of the remaining records. Institutional policies about maintaining 
records vary and in many cases the documents may no longer be in exis-
tence.125 In particular, custodians of sensitive information may choose to 
destroy the records after a set time period, thus avoiding future disclosure 
children who survive A and live to age thirty. In order to prevent indefinite control over property, the 
Rule Against Perpetuities limits the grant to interests that vest not later than twenty-one years past the 
life of a person in being at the time of the creation of the interest Thus A's interest would vest imme-
diately upon the testator's death (a life in being) and faH within the time frame. Assuming, from the 
language, that A's children are not in existence at the time of the will, their interest fails-it vest thirty 
years after the death of A (the life in being). WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW 
OF PROPERTY 118(3d ed. 2000). 
123 The Rule Against Perpetuities is thought to have developed specificaHy to avoid tying up 
land. ld. at 126 (stating that "[t]he additional twenty-one years included in the perpetuities period 
seems to have been derived from the period of an actual minority during which a fee tail estate could be 
made unba:rrable at common law .. ). 
124 It is an interesting question whether current reproductive technologies will alter estate rules 
such as this. Consider the case of frozen embryos that are kept in storage indefinitely--could they 
function as the hypothetical "life in being" by which to measure time? ANDREW MORRISS & SHARONA 
HOFFMAN, BIRTH AFTER DEATH: PERPETUTITES AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (forth-
coming 2002). 125 The issue of what to do with medical records has never been entirely clear. Some institutions 
and associations have developed their own policies and destroy records after a certain time period. 
ROACH, supra note 10, at 36-43. State statutes that control the retention of records usually do so in 
light of statutes oflimitations for tort actions, or based on concerns about spoliation of evidence. Many 
states have no specific requirement for retention of medical records. Douglas Rallo, No Cure Yet For 
Spoilation of Patient Records, CHI. B. Ass'N REC, Oct. 1992, at 30. However, Medicare guidelines 
require hospitals to maintain medical records for at least five years. Condition of Participation: Medi-
cal Record Services, 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b)(l) (2000). And OSHA guidelines also address retention of 
medical records. Rules of Agency Practice and Procedure Concerning OSHA Access to Employee 
Medical Records, 29 C.F.R. §1913.10 (2000) (requiring retention by OSHA only for so long as needed 
to.accomplish the purpose of access). The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals states that 
the length of time that medical records are to be retained is dependent on the need for their use in 
continuing patient care and for legal, research, and educational purposes and on law and regulation. 
JOlNT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORO., COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MAN-
UAL FOR HosP. IM-5 (Jan. 2000). And the American Health Information Management Association 
delineates specific retention times for different types of records. ROACH, supra note 10, at 40 (reprint-
ing guidelines). 
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of the infonnation. 126 
B. Who Controls Information Postmortem? 121 
Having identified the relevant factors to consider, I now turn to the is-
sue of who has responsibility for evaluating the factors and detennining 
when disclosure is appropriate. 128 In the context of living patients, in-
126 A historian, for example, may argue in favor of preservation. The bottom line evaluation en-
tails a weighing between the interests promoted by confidentiality and those promoted by disclosure (or 
preservation). Eventually, the interests of aU people currently Jiving in the confidentiality of the re-
cords/information in question would be greatly attenuated (because of the time elapsed) .. And it may ~e 
hard to argue that patients will alter their willingness to communicate with their physicians based on 
the possibility that the information will be accessible decades after their death. So the final disposition 
of the records may be merely a matter of administrative convenience. 
127 Confidentiality, as I have stated earlier, is usually framed in terms of"control" over informa-
tion. There are some commentators who argue that privacy rights are miscast as rights of individual 
control over information, since people are not really able to control all information about themselves. 
Instead, privacy should be thought of in terms of balancing the interests involved. See Anita M. Allen, 
Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 
861, 861-62 (2000) (stating that .. [t]he popularity of the privacy-control paradigm is problematic be-
cause there are a number of conceptual, practical, and moral limits to its plausibility); Paul M. 
Schwartz,. Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815, 834 (2000) (noting that "access to 
personal information and limits on it help form the society in which we live and shape our individual 
identities"). 
Other authors accept the "'control paradigm" and suggest the creation of an intellectual property 
right in personal information. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy and Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1125, 1130 (2000). But why should an individual be thought to have a property right in .informa-
tion pertaining to herself? This is not to say that there isn't a privacy interest, but despite the fact that 
individuals play a role in constructing their identity, they do not "create" .it, at least in the sense of a 
creation that is due intellectual property protection. See id. at 1136-46 (pointing out the problems with 
creating such a right). See generally Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy: A. New Legal Paradigm?, 
52 STAN. L. REv. 987, 987-1461 (2000) (discussing recent changes in cyberspace and the resulting 
implications on privacy interests). Consider the case of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a person's interest in his reputation alone was not cognizable as 
property within the meaning of the due process clause. ld. at 712. At least one author argues in favor 
of a control paradigm, but based on personal autonomy, rather than property rights. Julie E. Cohen, 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377 
{2000). This would be analogous to my arguments for control over identity and memory. Another 
author suggests using new technologies to create a trusted system that would allow individuals limited 
control over access to their private information, including medical records. Jonathan Zittrain, What the 
Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in the Era of Trusted Privication, 
52 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1240 (2000). Such a model would not be inconsistentwith my suggestions. 
128 Many state stat>.ttes give control of a decedent's medical records to the executor ·of the estate. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ l2-2294(B)(8)(a){t) (West 2000)(permitting health care provider to disclose 
a deceased patient's medical records to patient's personal representative or estate administrator); VA. 
CoDE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(0)(23) (Michie 2001) (permittinghealth care provider to disclose a de-
ceased patient's medical records to the patient's personal representative, executor, or legal guardian). 
One possible rationale for granting authority over the records is to allow access to information 
needed for lawsuits .(for example, medical malpractice), but more likely the rule serves to provide a 
clearly designated individual who can make decisions about the disposition of the records. Giving 
control to an executor is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that very few 
circumstances would warrant disclosure of a complete medical record. 
Durable Power's of Attorney for health care (or other health care statutory proxy documents) give 
authority to access the medical records of the patient to the designated proxy. This situation makes 
sense during the patient's life, but even then it is not clear that the proxy should have access to aU the 
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formed consent functions to protect the individual interests-it is the pa-
tient who determines what information should be shared, except in cases 
where there is a risk of significant harm to another individuaL 
application of this doctrine to the postmortem context encounters serious 
limitations. The primary difference in the postmortem context is the 
obvious one--the deceased patient is no longer in existence. This turns out 
to have. a number of implications for the general framework of disclosure 
protections. First, the patient clearly is unable to consent to disclosure. 
Thus although a physician initially might approach a living patient seeking 
either consent for disclosure or encouraging the patient himself to disclose 
the infonnation, this route is unavailable after the patient has died. 
Moreover, even if an individual has explicitly stated that she does not want 
the infonnation disclosed at any time in the future, 129 there is no way for 
her to change her mind. Thus, new or different requests for information 
cannot be brought, as they can be to living patients, for an individual 
determination. 
Although it will certainly be pertinent that ·the deceased has left spe-
cific instructions regarding disclosure, 130 the interests in self-determination 
in this context are not the same as those for living patients. Self-
determination presumes control over the ''self."131 To the extent that the 
self is no longer in existence, the interests in self-determination are less-
ened.132 As a result, in cases where third-party interests in disclosure (or 
confidentiality) are strong enough, they may be able to overcome even the 
deceased's previous explicit statements on the matter. But the interests in 
patient's medical records compiled during his or her lifetime. On the other hand, the proxy in question 
is designated by the patient, and thus less problematic than an executor, since the patient surely con,. 
ternplated disclosure of some information to the proxy. 
129 Patients who explicitly grant permission for postmortem disclosure thereby waive confidenti· 
ality protections and the resulting disclosure does not constitute a breach. Acosta v. Richter, 671 So.2d 
149, .lSI (Fla. 1996) (holding waiver of confidentiality of medical information exists where patient 
provides written authorization). 
13° For example, the individual's specific instructions are taken into account in the evaluation of 
the sensitivity of the information. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.a. 
Ul ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURRO-
GATE DECISION MAKINO 166 (1990). 
132 Buchanan and Brock argue that for currently living incompetent patients, the right to self· 
determination is a "quasi-property" right and may "justifiabiy be overridden to secure some very im-
portant good or to avoid some important hann." /d. at 166. SpecificaUy, .. if faced with a choice be.:. 
tween following one person's wishes in an advance directive and saving another person's life we would 
have to disregard the advance directive." /d. at 168. Whether or not this argument is valid in the case 
ofliving patients, it is surely true for deceased patients. 
In explaining why it is important to consider advance decisions made by (now) incompetent pa-
tients, Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between experiential and critical interests. RONALD DWORKIN, 
LIFE'S DoMINION 201,;,08 (1993). Critical interests are an individual's interests in living a good life as 
she defines i~ and are closely linked with the notion of identity, discussed above. The dead clearly 
have no experiential interestS. Although the dead may retain critical interests (at least to the extent that 
they retain any interests in identity after death), I have already pointed out that these are lessened. 
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disclosure must be particularly strong to overcome the deceased,s interests, 
as well as societal interests in maintaining the validity of advance direc-
tives and other patient decision-making tools. Most patients, however, are 
never asked about the use of their previously gathered medical information 
after their death, and are thus unlikely to have indicated their preferences. 
The re$ult is that someone other than the patient will control its use. 
As a general rule, surrogate consent mechanisms {for example, proxy 
decision makers), 133 which usually function in situations where the patient 
cannot make a decision, do not necessarily work in this context. There are 
two reasons for this-one practical and the other theoretical. First, the 
individual most likely to be designated as a surrogate is a family member134 
and this is quite often just the person who is seeking the information. 
Health information about a deceased patient has a personal health impact 
on a small group of people-generally those who are either blood relations 
or those who are in close everyday contact {for example, spouse, if conta-
gious disease). These are exactly the next-of-kin who would be identified 
as appropriate surrogate decision makers in other contexts since they are 
the people who are best able to determine what the individual would have 
wanted had he or she been available to make the decision. And yet it 
seems ludicrous to ask, for example, a wife if she thinks her husband 
would want her to know certain information that has implications for her 
health. Moreover, shifting the identity of the surrogate is not likely to be 
an acceptable solution since as you move further away from close family 
members you are less likely to find an individual who is able accurately to 
ascertain the patient's preferences or best interests. Finally, disclosure to 
these individuals for purposes of evaluating the patient's preferences 
would result in an initial breech of confidentiality, which may not be ap-
propriate in many circumstances. 
The second problem with surrogate decision·making is theoretical-a 
"best interests" inquiry is almost meaningless with respect to a deceased 
person, and it is almost impossible for anyone to accurately ascertain the 
133 Surrogate decision-makers are individuals who make choices about medical care in place of a 
patient (because the patient lacks·capacity). They are designated by statute,.courts (for example, guard-
ian), or by the patient in an advance care document (for example, proxy). See JESSICA BERGET AL., 
lNFORMEDCONSENT: LEGAL THEORYANDCLINICALPRACTICE 109(2001). , 
134 The preference for family members is based on a number of factors. There is some evidence 
that relatives are better able to accurately judge patient preferences. Joseph Ouslander et al .• Health 
Care Decision Among Elderly Long~term Care Residents and Their Potential Proxies, 149 ARCHIVES 
OF INTERNAL MED. 1367 (1989). This has not held true in all circumstances, especiaUyin the absence 
of any previous discussion between the family member and patient regarding treatment choices. 
Jeremiah Suhl et al., Myth of Substituted Judgment: Surrogate Decision Making Regarding Life Sup· 
port is Uunreliable, 154 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 90 (1994). And close family members are also 
likely in a better position to judge what action would be in the patient's best interests. BUCHANAN & 
BROCK, supra note 131, at 136. 
116 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [VoL 34:81 
deceased's preferences ("substituted judgmenf') in this context. 135 For 
example, drawing from evidence that the patient had during his life-
time, disclosed the information, does not necessarily answer the question 
of what the individual would want done after death. Quite literally, the 
substituted judgment standard asks the surrogate to place herself in the 
position of the deceased in order to determine what he would have done 
had he been able to make the decision. The patient is not merely unavail-
able or lacking in decision-making capacity, but is no longer in existence! 
Under the best circumstances the substituted judgment standard is a type of 
legal fiction. 136 For deceased individuals, it makes even less sense to apply 
the standard in the absence of the deceased's previous explicit statements 
on the matter. 137 
135 Some authors have argued that advance directives (and application of the substituted judg-
ment standard) are problematic even for patients who are still living. The concern is that some condi-
tions of severe incapacity, which trigger advance directives and surrogate decision-making, alter per-
sonal identity. Or to put it another way, the now incompetent person is not the "'same" person as the 
previous competent individual. This change in identity forces one to reconsider whether the instruc· 
tions or preferences of the previously competent person should apply to the now incompetent individ-
ual. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 119~23 (1984} (arguing that personal identity is based 
on psychological continuity); Rebecca Dresser, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable 
Policy, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 33-35 (1995) (pointing out that .. people exercising advance 
planning are denied knowledge of treatments and other relevant information that may emerge during 
the time between making a directive and giving it effect); Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompe-
tent Patients: Conceptual infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 373, 379 (1986) 
(arguing that a person's interests can change radically by the time the life and death situation arises); 
Rebecca Dresser & John Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent 
Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 234, 236 (1989) (com-
menting that "it is wrong to assume that the incompetent patient's prior competent preferences are the 
best indicator of the patient's current interests); Rebecca Dresser & Peter J. Whitehouse, The lncompe· 
tent Patient on the Slippery Slope, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6, 6 (1994) (explaining that the current 
model for basing decisions on the patient's former competent concerns overlooks changes in interests 
that may accompany incompetency). 
Other authors rebut this conclusion, arguing that advance directives and substituted judgment 
mechanisms are correctly applied in this context. See Jeffrey Blustein, Choosing for Others as Con-
tinuing a Life Story: The Problem of Persona/Identity Revisited, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 20 (1999). 
Blustein argues that "proxy decision-makers should regard themselves as continuers of the life stories 
of those who have lost narrative capacity" and that this theory "provides a defense of the moral author-
ity of advance directives that is immune to the loss of personal identity objection." /d. at 21. See also 
DWORKIN, supra note 132, at 201-08 (discussing the need to fully understand the "dimension of the 
interests people have" in determining someone's best interests). See also BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra 
note 131, at 162-89 (arguing that there are interests which survive incapacity and thus advance direc-
tives should be applied). Buchanan and Brock argue (correctly I think) that if there are interests that 
survive death, then there are certainly interests that survive incapacity. !d. at 163. But the reverse is 
not necessarily true--there may be interests that survive incapacity, but not death. 
136 Historically, the doctrine of substituted judgment appears to have been borrowed from English 
common law where it developed as a legal fiction allowing courts to distribute .parts of a "lunatic's" 
estate to relatives that were' not owed any duty of support. Although it initially started out with no 
constraints, it quickly became dependent upon evidence of what the incompetent person would have 
wanted (or done) were he competent. Louis Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the 
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 1, 16 (1990). 
137 These statements may be oral or written. Note that this does not mean we cannot make gen-
eral inferences such as "most people would want their medical information to remain confidential." 
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As a general rule, physicians (or, more common today, health care or-
ganizations-HCOs) own the actual medical records and thus have the 
obligation to maintain confidentiality of· the information contained 
therein. 138 Likewise, in the postmortem context, it is these information 
caretakers who should have the responsibility to consider the issues identi-
fied above and determine whether disclosure is appropriate. In evaluating 
the interests in disclosure, the extent of the individual or public health need 
would be determined by the health professional in whose possession the 
information is kept Physicians have ~he expertise to evaluate health needs. 
Moreover, they generally have been. charged with balancing needs for con-
fidentiality against needs for disclosure and there is no reason why they 
should not have this responsibility in these cases. Furthermore, physicians 
should be responsible for determining sensitivity, absent individual or legal 
guidance. This assures that sensitive information will not be shared with 
others until is it determined that disclosure is appropriate-thus maintain-
ing confidentiality to the greatest extent. 
Although traditional surrogate decision-making tools may not be ap-
plicable in.many situations, family involvement in confidentiality determi-
nations may still be appropriate, particularly when the issue is disclosure 
for general interest reasons. 139 An analogy may be made to the organ dona-
But this is not an application of a substituted judgment standard. Nor does this mean we might not seek 
consent from other individuals. But the surrogate's role in this context is not to promote self-
detennination, but to make decisions based either on a hypothetical reasonable person standard, or their 
own preferences. 
138 This reflects the current state ofthe law regarding medical records and infonnation. Although 
physicians control the physical records, patients are considered the ••owners" of the infonnation con-
tained therein. Striegal v. Tofano, 399 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585-86 (Spec. Term 1977). The AMA Code of 
Ethics provides that: · 
notes made in treating a patient are primarily for the physician's own use and constitute his 
or her personal property. However, on request .of the patient a physician should provide a 
copy or a summary of the record to the patient or to another physician, an attorney, or other 
person designated by the patient. 
Am. Med. Ass'n, Code of Medical Ethics, Op. 7.02. 101 (1996). 
139 Many states, in fact, explicitly authorize access to particular medical records by relatives. 
One example is state law allowing family access to autopsy information. N,D. CENT. CODE§ 23-02.1-
27 (Supp. 2001) (aHowing relative or personal representative access to information indicating cause of 
death which. may be based on practical reasoning that in the absence of such disclosure the relatives 
wiU withhold consent to the autopsy). AM. MED. ASS'N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUD. AFFS., CON· 
FIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH INFO POSTMORTEM REPORT S·A-00 (June 2000). The access to medical 
infonnation by relatives of a deceased is in line with their general authority to determine what happens 
to the deceased's bodily remains. Even so, control over medical information raises privacy concerns 
not implicated by control over bodily remains. Hawaii explicitly denies that deceased individuals have 
privacy interests in their autopsy reports. but recognizes interests of living people who are mentioned in 
an autopsy report and states that "disclosure of that report, under the UIP A, will depend upon a balanc-
ing of the privacy interests of that living individual against the public interest in disclosure." Disclo-
sure of Autopsy Reports, Haw. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-32 (Dec. 31, 1991), 1991 WL 474729 (Haw. 
A.G.). The Hawaii Legislature, however, has just enacted comprehensive confidentiality protections 
that continue to apply postmortem. See supra note 24. The implications with respect to autopsy re-
ports are unclear. Nevada, by contrast, states that autopsy reports should remain completely confiden-
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tion situation where health professionals have recognized that there are 
other interests involved besides those of the deceased patient, specifically 
those of close family members. 140 Seeking family consent allows family 
members to have input into a decision to disclose information that may 
have implications for their own health, and thus identities. 141 Even for in-
formation that does not have implications for the health status (and thus 
identity or privacy) of family members, 142 family consent is still appropri-
ate in this context. As noted previously, one of the interests in maintaining 
confidentiality after death is based on the interests of those close to the 
deceased in maintaining the memory of the deceased. 143 It is worth noting, 
however, that the idea of family consent-based on the notion that it is 
most closely linked with the interests of deceased-is not without contro-
versy. In the case of a psychiatrist's disclosures of taped interviews with 
the famous poet Anne Sexton, . the daughter of the poet· gave permission, 
claiming her responsibility to the literary community.144 Further inquiry 
into the matter, however, showed that such motivation was questionable. 145 
tial since there is "no public intereSt in disclosure sufficient to outweigh the public policy of confidenti-
ality of personal medical infonnation." Autopsy Reports: Public Records, Nev. Op. Atfy Gen. No. 82-
12 (June 15, 1982), 1982 WL 181273 (Nev. A.G.). 
Because disclosure to family is a breach of confidentiality in itself. the physician must consider 
whether this initial disclosure is appropriate in each case. When the physician detennines that disclo-
sure for general interest would not be appropriate as a general matter, disclosure to family members 
may similarly be inappropriate. 
140 See Laura A. Siminoff & Kala Chinag, The Fallacy of the 'Gift of Life', 29 HAsTINGS CrR. 
REP. 34, 36 (1999) (discussing donor families). In fact, consent of family members is often sought 
even when the patient has explicitly consented to donation. Many authorS have challenged this prac· 
tice. although there are a variety of practical reasons for its existence (for example, fear of lawsuits). 
141 The consent would be based on the preferences of the surrogate. rather than an arti(~eial appli-
cation of surrogate decision-making ·standards. Where the executor of the estate is not a relative. this 
individual may be a less appropriate spokesperson for the interests of the family. 
142 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 610.035 (West 2000) (allowing postmortem disclosure of social 
security numbers provided the state agency disclosing the information knows of no reason why such 
disclosure would prove detrimental to the· deceased individual's estate or hannful to the deceased 
individual's living relatives). 
[D]eath certificates ..• should be presumed to be open to the public for inspection as public 
records . • • . However, where disclosure might lead to an unwarranted invasion of privacy 
which would result in irreparable harm to survivors, or to the reputation of the deceased, the 
Office of Vital Statistics may appropriately refuse inspection. 
Nev. Op. Att'y Gen., No. 90~8 (Apr. 27, 1990), 1990 WL 516489 (Nev. A.G.). But cf Ky. Op. Att'y 
Gen., No. 81-149 (Apr. 9, !98!), 1981 WL 142183 (Ky, A.G.) ("A deceased person has no personal 
privacy rights and the personal privacy rights of living individuals do not reach matters concerning 
deceased relatives."). 
143 See discussion infra Part UI.B.2. 
144 Sharon Carton, The Poet, The Biographer and the Shrink: Psychiatrist-Patient Confidentiality 
and the Anne Sexton Biography, tO U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 117. 122 (1993). 
145 /d. Interestingly, when questioned, the daughter noted that "[a} literary executor is the future 
eyes and ears of the artist, and her most important duty is to keep the work both visible and alive after 
the author dies. Sometimes I was able to obey instructions left me, other times I had to override them.,. 
LindaGrey Sexton, A Daughter's Story: I Knew Her Best, N.Y. TIMES, Aug~ 18, 1991, at 20. It is not 
clear what role executors (literary or otherwise) are supposed to play in this context. As the discussion 
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Even so, family control over the information is generally appropriate. It is 
their memories regarding the deceased, after all, which are most at risk. 
Moreover, we can presume, in the absence of specific instructions to 
the contrary, that most patients would want their family involved in these 
decisions. Furthermore, physicians are not experts in judging newsworthi-
ness, in contrast with health needs, and thus family involvement in these 
determinations provides an additional safeguard against improper disclo-
sure. However, when the physician feels that the information should be 
kept confidential even from family (because of its sensitivity), disclosure 
for general interest would be inappropriate. Finally, acknowledging the 
role of family brings up another question: Who should count as "family"? 
The group of potentially affected individuals may.be quite large. As are .. 
suit, it may be most practical to borrow from the traditional next-of-kin 
hierarchy of decision makers, perhaps designating a spokesperson for fam-
ily interests. 146 
C. Disclosure in Practice 
Although physicians have the primary responsibility to evaluate re-
quests for disclosure, they should not be considered to have a duty147 to 
of surrogate decision-making· standards in the previous section highlighted-ideas about substituted 
judgment and best interests do not easily fit into the postmortem context. As this case demonstrates, 
even where the deceased may have left explicit instructions, the executor's role may be to evaluate the 
instructions in light of a broader responsibility (here, to the deceased's literary work and persona}. 
146 The class of family members potentially affected by the information may be extensive. Con-
tacting aU of these individuals and obtaining their consent may entail great costs, both in time and 
money. In some cases it may be more practical to simply assign a spokesperson(s) for the family 
interests. Depending on the sensitivity of the information in question and its iinpact on the privacy 
interests of remaining family, it might be advisable to seek a consensus on the matter from all close 
family members. See discussion supra Part III.2.a. This, of course. raises the question of who to count 
as "close .. family members. Like the duty-to-warn dilemma identified below, see discussion infra note 
149, the physician must consider whether to consult children, grandchildren, siblings, and others. To 
some extent this requirement may make disclosure impractical and thus the default in most cases would 
be maintaining confidentiality protections. 
147 The concept of a duty to warn in this context originated in the California case Tarasoffv. Re-
gents of California, 551 P .2d 334 (Cal. 1976). In TarasojJ, a patient informed his therapist of his 
intention to kill a young woman. ld. at 341. After her murder, the family sued claiming that the physi-
cian should have warned the victim. /d. at 342. The court held that a therapist might be required to 
reveal infonnation gathered during counseling if the patient's statements indicate that he is likely to 
seriously injure an identifiable third party. /d. at 345. 
A number of states have adopted this doctrine and some have extended it to all physicians or 
mental health professionals. Christine E. Stenger, Taking Tarasoff Where No One Has Gone Before: 
Looking at "Duty to Wanf" Under the AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. LouiS U. PUB. L. REv. 471, 476 {1996). 
Duty to warn cases focus on ( 1) the seriousness of the threat of hann, and (2) the identifiability of the 
victim. TarasojJ, 551 P.2d at 347. Thus, a physician is not under an obligation to reveal threats of 
minor harm. threats that the physician does not believe are serious, or general threats where there is no 
identifiable third party. Duty to warn cases are not without controversy, and some people believe that 
positing such a duty places the physician in the. undesirable role of law enforcer, rather than healer. 
John 0. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Yictim: The Therapists Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. 
REv. 1025, 1045-46 (1974). It is unclear whether the conflict between such roles forces physicians into 
an untenable position with respect to confidentiality, and thus undermines generally the protections of 
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disclose information in the absence of a specific request. 148 Positing a duty 
in this context is particularly problematic. First, the physician in whose 
custody the information resides may not have any contact with the poten-
tially affected family members. The physician may be the pathologist who 
conducts the autopsy, or simply (as is more and more true these days) an 
internist treating only one family member. Furthermore, the group of po-
tentially affected parties may be large and it would be onerous to require 
the physician to track down everyone.149 Moreover, in some cases the in-
dividuals in question may want to exercise their right not to know particu-
lar information and it would be inappropriate for a physician to force in-
formation on unwilling recipients.150 
Although a duty to warn is inappropriate, there may be situations in 
which a physician will voluntarily seek to inform, even in the absence of a 
request for information. For example, a physician who is acquainted with 
a deceased's spouse and discovers important information relating to a 
contagious disease may choose to disclose such information. Like 
disclosures following a particular request, these breaches of confidentiality 
should also be allowed. Thus the physician in the colon cancer case 
described in the introduction should not have been held to have a duty to 
warn the ten-year old (and from a practical standpoint we might question 
how this would have been handled), but may permissibly disclose the 
information to her remaining parent or guardian, explaining the possibility 
of disease inheritance. · 
Physicians who receive requests for information should consider care-
fully the extent to which confidential information should be shared. Dis-
closures should be limited to the specific need in question; under almost no 
circumstances should information be disclosed publicly. 151 Rarely, if ever, 
should entire medical records be shared. Even for living patients, physi-
medical information. Perhaps because oftbis concern, many states have been hesitant to extend such a 
duty to health professionals. 
148 This is not to say that a physician who does not appropriately balance the interests in question 
cannot be held accountable before a court or other review mechanism. 
149 For example, would it be enough to infonn children or should grandchildren also be told? 
What about siblings or nieces and nephews? One possibinty is to tell one individual and rely on that 
person to spread the word-but such action would not necessarily discharge the physician's obligation 
if.a "duty to warn" were applicable. Another possibility is to use a "reasonable effort" standard. which 
would oblige the physician to make all reasonable efforts to contact potentially affected individuals. 
But this also might impose too great a burden on a physician who cannot afford time away from their 
current rtients to seek out relatives of a deceased patient. 
15 Although it is possible for the physician to contact individuals and tell them merely that she 
has "information pertaining to their health that they may wish to know," this wilt not completely solve 
the right not to know problem. 
151 The deceased patient cannot lose health insurance, employment, etc. There may, however. be 
concerns about the use of the information with respect to the family members still living. Thus, a 
physician will rarely be justified in disclosing the information beyond the individuals affected. 
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cians may not have to grant access to a complete medical record, 152 and in 
most circumstances it will be more appropriate to provide a summary of 
the information contained therein.153 
Finally, confidentiality requirements should extend to all individuals 
who gain access to the information, thus an initial disclosure should not 
vitiate the protections. In general, confidentiality determinations will be 
made informally, by these information caretakers, as is done for living pa-
tients.154 Accountability for abiding by the standards may be dealt with 
through common law or statutory confidentiality protections, many of 
which may already exist and should be read to be applicable to the post .. 
mortem context, as limited by the model identified here. Alternatively, the 
failure appropriately to consider the factors may be remediable as malprac-
tice. 
152 At least forty-one states have statutes that govern patient access to general medical records. 
ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.005 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2293 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 
16-46-106 (Michie 1994); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123110 (Deering 2001); COLO. REV. 
STAT.§ 25-1-802 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. §20-7c (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 456.057 (West 2001); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 31·33-2 (Harrison 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 323C-IJ (2000); 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. § 518-2001 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN.§ 16-39~1-l (Michie 1993); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 422.317 (Michie 2001); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.96 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22 § 1711-B {West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. l § 4-304 (2000); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12CC (West Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 333.20201(2)(b) (2001); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 144.335 (West Supp. 2001); MISS. CODEANN. § 41-9-65 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 
191.227 (West 1996); MONT. CoDE ANN. § 50..16-541 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629.061 
(Michie Supp. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-I:l (Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8 
(West Supp. 2001); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 18 (McKinney Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 58-39-
45 (1999); OHIO REV. CoDE ANN.§ 3701.74 (Anderson Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76 § 19 
(West Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.525 (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6155 (West 2000); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 5-37-22 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-325 (Law. Co-op 2000); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 34- t 2-15 (Michie Supp. 2001 ); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-ll-304 (Supp. 2000); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 241.154 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-25-25 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 32.1-127.1:03 (Michie Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 70.02.080 (West Supp. 2001); 
W.VA. CODEANN. § 16-29-1 (Michie Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 146.83 (West Supp. 2001); 
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 35-2-611 (Michie 2001). 
A number of states have statutes that specifically address access to mental health records. See 
ALA. CODE§ 22-56-4(b)(l) (Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5161(13) (Supp. 1995); IDAHO 
CODE§ 66-346(7) (Michie 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433.504 (Michie 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-I-19 (Michie Supp. 2000). Likewise. certain statutes limit access of the patient to his or her 
mental health records. See N.Y. MENTAL HYO. LAW§ 33.J6(c)(l) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (allowing 
access unless it could "reasonably be expected to cause substantial harm to the patient .. ). 
153 See, e:g.; Am. Med. Ass'n, Code of Medical Ethics, Op. 7.02 (2000-2001 ); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. I§ 4-304(2)(i) (Supp. 2000) (requiring health care provider to provide a summary of the 
portion of a psychiatric or psychological record that the provider may refuse to disclose in full); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (2001) (allowing physician to provide a summary of a patient's health care 
information upon !\patient's request). 
154 Although I recognize that HMOs or other health organizations will often be the owners of the 
records, physicians should make evaluations regarding disclosure. See discussion supra note 138 and 
accompanying text (discussing control of medical records and evaluation ofhealth needs}: 
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We are a society strangely obsessed both with privacy and obtaining 
information. There are numerous aspects of our lives that are available for 
anyone to access and yet most people remain either unaware of these pos-
sibilities, or unconcerned with the potential trespass. Medical information 
is one of the most contradictory areas. Most patients are not even aware of 
the extent to which information about their care is shared within a hospital 
setting, but are horrified by the potential that an insurer may need access 
for reimbursement purposes. Confidentiality protections for medical in-
formation are currently undergoing scrutiny at both the federal and state 
level. But amidst all the discussion, one area has seen little attention-the 
extent of confidentiality protections postmortem. This article attempts to 
remedy that oversight. 
I have argued that to determine the extent of confidentiality protections 
postmortem, the goals sought to }?e achieved by confidentiality must be 
balanced against the goals sought to be achieved by disclosure. Privacy 
values are important, but may be· outweighed by health needs. Moreover, 
to the extent that disclosure better serves health needs, it should he al-
lowed. I have eschewed bright line rules, arguing that most issues of con-
. fidentiality must be considered on a case-by-case basis. The physician has 
the obligation to determine the appropriateness of disclosure, as is tradi-
tionally the case for almost all medical information, and family members 
should be involved when appropriate. Although states may adopt statutes 
incorporating. my framework, in general, legal institutions such as courts 
should have little role in these evaluations, except as an ultimate review 
mechanism in cases of disputes. 
As a final note I want to . stress that the framework provided here can 
be used with respect to the premortem context as well as the postmortem 
one. In fact, the factors identified apply equally well to information sought 
regarding living patients. Obviously the interests involved may weigh dif-
ferently-in particular the interests articulated by the currently living pa-
tient are due a certain amount of deference, and self-determination plays a 
greater role. But, although I think that we would do well to reconsider the 
scope of confidentiality protections overali, since my focus has been on the 
postmortem context, I do not advocate for wholesale adoption of my 
framework in the premortem context without further analysis. 
